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UNTIL
1972

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I. GENERAL.

- 2
1. Concert an appeal to the whole world by the three U's - United Kingdom (plus Dominions), U.S.A., U.S.S.R.

The points in the address would include -

A summary of the case against Hitler.

His repeated breach of his word, with emphasis on the most recent cases.

A warning to the Axis Powers of what to expect from Hitler (addressed to Italy, Japan, Hungary, Bulgaria and the "Quislings").

A special warning to countries under German pressure such as Vichy, Turkey, Spain, Portugal, ending with

An appeal to all nations, including those adhering to the Axis to join a League of Freedom with the object of resisting the threat, now unconcealed, of world domination by Germany. They should be asked to prepare, each nation according to its circumstances, action to be taken simultaneously when the moment arises, by sea, land or air, by economic warfare, active rebellion, large scale sabotage, passive resistance, strikes, release of shipping, or supplies, or other measures calculated to injure Germany or assist the League of Freedom.

2. An early Conference in London, where a number of the Governments are located, to concert plans to carry out the Declaration.
3. Early diplomatic action to secure at least a modus vivendi for co-operation between Russia and Poland.

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SECRET.PERSONAL TO
PRIME MINISTER.

I venture to suggest some
heads for taking advantage of
Hitler's attack on Soviet Russia in the
hope that some of these might help
you. As we are in with these ruffians
we ought to make the best of it.

23rd June, 1941.

II. RUSSIA.

4. Propose the usual exchange of Mission, ⁴ including representation of the C.U.S. Committee; Economic Warfare, Information; Supply; M.A.P; War Transport (including Shipping and Railway Exports as the railways are probably in bad condition); and a Petroleum Export (Mr. Berthoud from Cairo) to assist in all measures for hampering enemy oil supplies, including, if necessary, destruction of Russian supplies, and other oil questions.
5. Appoint a Head of Mission (? Sir Stafford Cripps) to lead the Mission and organise it before departure. Otherwise muddle will arise.
6. Ascertain Russia's principal military needs, emphasising the importance of detailed specifications in the case of war material.
7. Suggest measures of economic warfare.

III. JAPAN.

8. Diplomatic efforts, in the most friendly way, to bring home to Japan the warning of this latest example of Hitler's perfidy. Accompany this by a spontaneous and simultaneous announcement by the Dominions and ourselves that, as goods can no longer leak to Germany through Russia, we shall make our economic policy easier for Japan.
9. Secure action corresponding to 6 by U.S.A.
10. If Japan reacts favourably the moment might be opportune for the project favoured by the late Lord Lloyd and Mr. Shigemitsu of a Mission to Japan, which, in concert with a similar Mission from U.S.A. would attempt to compose the differences between Japan and China in order to meet the greater danger to both from Germany, and to clear up the situation in the Far East. Any action to avert war with Japan this year would be of incalculable value; still more their material aid, if forthcoming later.

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11. Consult Lord Halifax as to the desirability of his speaking to Mr. Hull and Mr. Shigemitsu about the above.

IV. ITALY. 12. Would it be worth while to approach Mussolini through any possible channel (if the Vatican) to impress on him the opportunity to shake off the chains which bind Italy in subservience to Germany? (In view of references to Mussolini in the Prime Minister's broadcast this might be considered later.)

V. OTHER AXIS POWERS. 13. A similar approach when possible to other Axis Powers. Russia might be useful with Bulgaria, and U.S.A. with all these States.

VI. TURKEY. 14. Bring home to the Turks the lesson of this latest example of the danger of trusting Germany, and the unique opportunity to join the League of Liberty, whose power is rapidly increasing, and to obtain mutual assistance from the U.K., U.S.A., and U.S.S.R. The fall of Damascus and any further successes in Syria should help, as this will greatly facilitate communications with Turkey.

VII. DIPLOMATIC ACTION ELSEWHERE. 15. The Foreign Secretary will no doubt take appropriate action in many countries, especially U.S.A. and including the Allied Governments established in London.

VIII. ADMINISTRATION. 16. Instruct all Government Departments to consider measures by which advantage can be taken of this opportunity to help the Russians, to obtain their help and to secure advantage.

17. Similar instructions to Committees.

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IX. HOME FRONT. 18. Can the Communists now be brought to help the national front?

55, Whitehall, S.W.1.
23rd June, 1941.

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M.P.

M.E.W.

24th June, 1941.

Our telegrams Nos.

To:
LORD HALIFAX,
WASHINGTON.

SECRET

Arfar No: 3529.
Cypher.
L.A.D.

Repeated to
Singapore.

In anticipation of probable Soviet requests we are anxious to be in a position to enable our economic mission, which is leaving tomorrow, to offer to the Soviets for immediate delivery 10,000 tons of rubber and 2,000 tons of tin, and for subsequent delivery in the year a further 15,000 tons of rubber and 5,000 tons of tin.

2. These transactions may directly or indirectly affect the quantities immediately available to American buyers and we hope that the American Government will be prepared to meet us by adjusting its own purchases accordingly. The quantities are so small compared to American requirements and past purchases, that the sacrifice required from them will be negligible.

3. These matters could no doubt be settled by negotiation between ourselves and the American interests involved. It is however essential that immediate arrangements should be made for the delivery of the first instalments. The Ministry of Supply probably hold at the present moment in Malaya a quantity of rubber sufficient to meet the greater part of the first consignment of 10,000 tons, but the stocks are distributed among several ports of shipment and it would, therefore, be of very great assistance to us if the co-operation of the American buyer could be obtained immediately for temporary release of certain quantities out of the stocks which he now holds in ports of shipment. Arrangements for replacing the rubber thus placed at our disposal could be made at a later date.

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4. The same roughly applies to tin. The Ministry of Supply may have to arrange for the immediate purchase of 2,000 tons through commercial channels.

✓
OFFICES OF THE WAR CABINET
GREAT GEORGE STREET, S.W.1

SECRET.

25th June, 1941. 9

Dear Lord Hankey

I see that one of the objects of the British Liaison Mission to Russia is to provide a channel through which Russian requests for material assistance can be communicated. The Mission have been told that if they receive requests for assistance they are not to promise either men or material, but should refer all such requests to the Chiefs of Staff.

It is therefore clear that requests for material will follow this one channel, and it will be for the Chiefs of Staff or for one of the Service Departments to refer any particular request to us if they wish.

The Paper from which I have derived this information was prepared before the despatch of certain suggestions which you mentioned to me, and which are no doubt under consideration.

Yours sincerely
Lord Hankey

The Rt. Hon. Lord Hankey.

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we may have the whole picture before our eyes.

Now that the British Mission is getting down to work in Moscow, we may well receive requests for supplies quite soon, and it is very satisfactory that arrangements have been made in advance to deal with them through a well established body.

John Lincard
Lincoln

Rt. Hon. Lord Hankey,
G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O.,
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster,
55, Whitehall, S.W.1.

THE U.K.C.C. AND SUPPLIES TO RUSSIA.

I. INTRODUCTION.

12

The Committee for the Co-ordination of Allied Supplies on July 3rd agreed "that the U.K.C.C. should, as a general rule, act as purchasing agents for such supplies to Russia as it (the Committee) had agreed to make, subject to any exceptions that might be indicated and subject to due consultation with the Raw Materials Department of the Ministry of Supply". This decision was subsequently elaborated in a telegram to Moscow which suggested that "precise details, terms, specifications, etc., could perhaps be settled more conveniently by direct negotiations in London between Soviet Trade Representatives and the U.K.C.C. to whom we have entrusted actual conclusion of sales. We suggest that the Soviet Government should give the necessary instructions for full powers to their Trade Representatives in London for this purpose". Later Moscow was told "the terms on which we have agreed to supply the various commodities on their list assume that H.M.G. and the U.K.C.C. will be the sole channels of supplies". Nevertheless in a letter of August 25th to the U.K.C.C. the Russian Trade Representatives state "we have no instructions preventing us from making independent purchases of some commodities. In spite of that, up to the present moment, the Trade Delegation of U.S.S.R. has made practically all the purchases through your Corporation, of which, doubtless, you are aware".

For British aid to be most effective the principle that H.M.G. will be the sole channel of supplies must be accepted by the Russians and their Trade Mission here so instructed. In practice the U.K.C.C. has been found by H.M.G. to be the most suitable channel for carrying out the agreed programme of help except where special circumstances rule, such as in the supply of oil products or military requirements.

II. THE WORK OF THE U.K.C.C. INVOLVES:

1. Finding out the exact Russian specifications as to quality and type of goods to be supplied.
2. Advising the Treasury of a proposed transaction and obtaining authority for it.
3. Advising the specifications to the Supply Department or Control concerned so that they may know what they are required to buy or provide.
4. Procuring these goods either, in the case of controlled or semi-controlled goods, from the Ministry concerned, which remains entirely responsible for buying the goods, or, in the case of non-controlled goods, itself buying through ordinary commercial channels.
5. Agreeing the price to be paid for the goods with the Russians, and obtaining their confirmation of orders.
6. Paying the Ministry concerned or the merchant for the goods bought.
7. Arranging for the goods to be centred in few ports so that their shipment may be speedy. This has necessitated, in the case of certain goods not readily available in one or two places, the U.K.C.C. accumulating stocks from the Controls or Supply Departments in anticipation of future requirements.
8. In conjunction with the Russians arranging for the routing of ships and their actual loading, or for the land

transport

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transport of the goods. In some cases paying the freight charges and arranging insurance of the goods.

9. Obtaining payment into the Clearing Account for the goods supplied.

The above brief outline of the work of the U.K.C.C. in a transaction has many variations depending on particular circumstances.

The closest touch is kept not only with the Russian Trade Representatives, but also with the Treasury, the Services, the Ministry of Economic Warfare, the Ministry of Supply and other Government Departments or Committees concerned.

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SECRET.

MOSCOW CONFERENCE.

REPORT ON PROCEEDINGS OF TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEE
OF THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE: PREPARED BY BRITISH AND
AMERICAN DELEGATIONS.

1. Soviet Delegates stated their estimated shipping need was capacity to lift 500,000 tons monthly, of which 270,000 tons would go to Archangel, 224,000 to Vladivostok, the balance by trans-Iranian routes.*

The Sub-Committee hoped that Anglo-American development of trans-Iranian facilities and Persian Gulf ports would permit meeting Soviet expectation of handling 60,000 tons through there by June 1942. Meanwhile balance in excess of present capacity of 6,000 tons per month would be sent to Vladivostok; thereafter Vladivostok would be reduced to 170,000 tons per month.

2. Northern Routes. Soviet Delegation stated that capacity of Archangel was sufficient to discharge quantities mentioned in paragraph 1, but based on experience of first convoy American and British delegates are sceptical whether these quantities can be dealt with, especially in winter. Soviet Delegation stated that 15 ships could be simultaneously discharged before icing, and expected that between middle and end of December: thereafter 12 vessels could be berthed further north at Ekonomiya. United States delegate suggested that monthly intake could be maintained by using this smaller number of larger vessels between December and April.

3. Soviet Delegation stated there would be three ice-breakers: "STALIN", "LENIN", and "LITKE", plus two smaller available for White Sea traffic. Soviet estimate was that ice-breaker could take between one and three vessels at a time, according to ice conditions, from the bar to open sea, at between 12 and 36 hours per batch. While awaiting ice-breaker assistance, either in or out, convoy would use Yukinga (half way between Murmansk and entrance to White Sea) which is ice-free. Admiral Miles is exploring with Soviet authorities necessary measures to make this bay safe.

4. Soviet Delegation stated they were prepared to accept 100,000 tons of cargo monthly for local and inland use at Murmansk, subject to their estimate of "conditions", which at present, in their view, were quite unsuitable.

5. Oil discharging and storage capacity was stated by Soviet Delegation to be sufficient to clear 10,000 tons monthly. Soviet Delegation required refined products only to Archangel. British and American Delegates suggest it would be wise to consider the above in the light of discharge performance of second convoy.

6. Vladivostok. Soviet Delegation stated port facilities were adequate to handle quantities mentioned in paragraph 1, the object of their proposals being to maintain Far Eastern provinces without recourse to transport by trans-Siberian from the West.

Documents submitted by the Russian Delegation on Archangel, Vladivostok and Murmansk are attached (Annex I.)

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Oil shipment would in 1942 be divided half and half between Vladivostok and Archangel. In 1941 a further 10,000 tons would be required in the Far East, balance being sent to Archangel during that period.

7. Trans-Iran. (a) Soviet Delegation agreed to accept at Kushk and Moshed such consignments as could be made available there by road. (b) Soviet acceptances at Kasvin would be 11,000 tons a month: at Bandar Caspian 250 tons a day now, rising to 700 by May 1942 when 12-foot channel would be dredged. (c) At Tabriz via Zenjan up to 30,000 tons a month, Soviet authorities agreeing that Anglo-American transport should operate between Zenjan and Tabriz.

8. Soviet authorities will make available 90,000 out of 500,000 tons carrying capacity, between 60 and 65 per cent. of theirs being available on Atlantic. 27,000 tons of tanker tonnage would also be available on Pacific: none on Atlantic.

90,000 tons are assessed on 75 day turn round on Atlantic: 60 day on Pacific and 145 on Persian Gulf. American Delegation thought Pacific turn round inadequate.

9. Soviet requests are that half food and half oil (1942) be sent to Vladivostok and Archangel.

Most war and raw materials to Archangel except such equipment as is necessary for Far East to be sustained without recourse to traffic eastwards on trans-Siberian railway.

10. Soviet Delegation stated it is desirable to strengthen ships for Archangel between 13th December and 30th April in accordance with drawing attached to fit with steel propeller blades preferably strong-hulled vessels to start with.

11. Ships' winches will be utilised throughout except for floating cranes at Archangel up to 135 tons and Vladivostok 120 tons, maximum of two being available at both ports.

12. Telegram Linon No. 42 repeated in substance to Maritime Commission gives details of monthly shipments required and provides destination and origin.

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ANNEX I.

Documents submitted by Russian Delegation on
Archangel, Vladivostok, Murmansk.

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1. ARCHANGEL. Accepts ships for loading and unloading all year round. Up to December (inc.) unloading will take place in Bakaritsa, 18 ships simultaneously. From January to April (inc.) unloading will take place at Ekonomia, 12 ships simultaneously.

2. at BAKARITSA. One berth has an 8-ton crane. Ships fitted with their own loading and unloading gear can berth at the remaining berths.

There are 2 floating cranes of 50 and 133 tons capacity respectively. There are also 2 railway cranes of 6-ton capacity each and 2 cranes mounted on caterpillar tracks with loading capacity of 8 tons each.

Additionally Archangel will be fitted with a number of movable and semi-movable cranes with capacity from 5 to 13 tons as well as with railway and caterpillar tractor cranes with capacity of from 6 to 8 tons.

It is desirable that 7 of the 13 cranes ordered in the U.S.A. be delivered in Archangel before the end of 1941.

3. Covered storage space in Bakaritsa is 15,500 square metres. This will be increased by building more covered storage buildings and sheds. There is sufficient open storage space. At Ekonomia covered buildings and sheds will have an area of 15,000 square metres.

4. Navigation of the Northern Dvina does not present any difficulties until the middle of December. Similarly, navigation in the White Sea does not present any difficulties until the end of December so far as ice is concerned. The ice cover is so thin that ships can move unaided and do not require special reinforcement against ice. Beginning with the second half of December in the Northern Dvina and the beginning of January in the White Sea navigation has to be aided by ice-breakers.

In the White Sea ships will all be conveyed by the ice-breaker "Stalin" and in the Northern Dvina by the ice-breaker "Lenin" and other auxiliary ice-breakers of less draught.

In the White Sea during the period February - March an ice-breaker can take two to three steamers at a time. At other times conveying through ice is easier and an ice-breaker can take a larger number of ships. In the Northern Dvina at the period of maximum ice an ice-breaker can take, at a time, 1 - 2 ships as far as Ekonomia.

Conveying by ice-breakers takes from 12 to 36 hours in accordance with the conditions of the ice.

Cargo steamers which are awaiting convey by ice-breakers also naval vessels of the convoy must be stationed in the bay of IOKANGA.

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5. Ships must be fitted with steel propellers with detachable blades and must have their hulls reinforced against ice, namely two stringers each on each side, forward and aft, as well as in the forward and aft holds, and additional ribs in the same parts.

During the period of the heaviest ice, namely February - March only such ships should be despatched to Archangel which do not exceed 6 - 7,000 tons deadweight. It is easier to convoy such ships through ice and there is less risk of damage to them.

6. It is desirable that ships arriving in Archangel should have on board a sufficient quantity of bunker coal or diesel fuel to provide for the return voyage, because during the period December to April, bunkering in Archangel complicates work and exposes ships to extra risk during passage through ice.

7. Experienced pilots will be provided for each ship during its passage behind the Ice-breaker.

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MURMANSK.

The port of Murmansk is open to navigation throughout the whole year. 12 ships with a draught of from 16 - 25 feet can be simultaneously discharged.

One of the berths is fitted with two movable cranes with a lifting capacity of 6 tons. At the rest of the berths discharging has got to be carried out by means of the ships own gear.

Besides this, for the purpose of handling general and heavy cargoes, there are:-

Railway, caterpillar, and motor cranes of a lifting capacity from 6 - 7.5 tons - 6.

Floating cranes, loading capacity 30 - 50 tons - 2

There is a bunkering ship for the purpose of bunkering ships in the harbour.

The Port can allot 30,000 sq. metres of storage space for the purpose of storing imported cargoes.

Open spaces for storing imported cargoes amount to 25 - 30,000 sq. metres.

In case of necessity additional space can be utilised in an area behind the Port.

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VLADIVOSTOK.

1. The Port of Vladivostok is open throughout the whole year. The period of ice lasts from January to March. In the worst years the ice does not extend further than the Island of Askold (25 miles).

An Icebreaker is employed during this period.

Up to the middle of January cargo steamers with reliable hulls can enter the port without the aid of an Icebreaker. The entry of the Port is effected with the help of pilots.

2. 10 steamers with draughts of from 22-28 feet can be simultaneously discharged.

There are warehouses as well as open storage spaces along the whole length of the Quay.

A total area of 30,000 sq. metres of covered storage space can be allotted for imported cargoes and there is an open area of 13,000 sq. metres.

3. The number of cranes in the Port is as follows:-

Electrically operated, movable cranes
with lifting capacity of 2 tons - 2.

Railway, tractor and motor cranes
with lifting capacity of 3-18 tons - 3.

Floating cranes with a lifting capacity
of 40-120 tons. - 2.



Reference T 31/68.

APPROXIMATE ESTIMATE OF VALUE INVOLVED IN
RUSSIAN REQUESTS FOR SUPPLIES.

The figures given below can only be regarded as approximate. Minimum and maximum figures in the two columns correspond with the alternative figures given in the list in telegram No. 77 Arafar from Moscow.

(a) <u>Rubber</u> at say £100	£ 5,000,000	£ 6,000,000
(b) <u>Tin</u> at say £300	2,400,000	3,000,000
(c) <u>Wool</u> at 2/6d per lb. (Australian merino)	4,200,000	5,600,000
(d) <u>Jute</u> at 40 rupees a bala (5-6 bales per ton - 1 rupee = one-sixth of £)	375,000	375,000
(e) <u>Shelling</u> at £2.10s a cwt.	50,000	50,000
(f) <u>Sole Leather</u> (according to quality) say	1,000,000	1,500,000
(g) <u>Lead</u> say at £20 per ton	600,000	800,000
(h) <u>Aluminium</u> at say £110 per ton	3,300,000	4,400,000
(i) <u>Molybdenum Concentrate</u> at £200 per ton	800,000	800,000
(j) <u>Copper</u> at £62 per ton	2,480,000	3,100,000
(k) <u>Rolled Brass</u> for cartridges etc. at £100 per ton	1,500,000	2,000,000

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(l) <u>Cobalt</u> (on the assumption that it is cobalt metal which is required) at 8/6d per lb.	£ 142,800	£ 150,400
(m) <u>Industrial Diamonds</u> (2 million U.S. dollars)	500,000	500,000
(n) <u>Iridium</u> at £30 per ounce.	88,000	88,000
(o) <u>Military boots</u> (no high military boots can be supplied but ordinary ankle boots can be supplied in large numbers at £1.2.6d per pair).	3,125,000	3,125,000
(p) <u>Woollen cloth</u> say overcoating at 6/- per metre	3,000,000	3,000,000
TOTAL	£28,460,800	£1,428,400

J.S.Daniel.

2.7.41

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TREASURY CHAMBERS,
Great George Street,
London, S.W.1.

Treasury Reference F.17663.

2nd July, 1941.

Dear Culpin,

22

I confirm my telephone message to you this morning to the effect that as far as the Treasury were concerned it is quite in order for you to inform Moscow that arrangements were proceeding at once to load S.S. Volga, at present at Singapore with 3,000 tons of rubber and 500 tons of tin to be sent to Vladivostock. I asked you to add to the telegram to Moscow that we would give immediate consideration to the question of payment as soon as we had received Sir S. Cripps' suggestions in this connection.

I understand that machinery and other matters dealing with Russia will be discussed tomorrow morning at Lord Hankey's Committee. In the meanwhile, you are getting out some approximate figures to indicate the value

(a) of the Russian demands on us, and

(b) the goods we might buy, for supply or other reasons, from them.

I am sending copy of this letter to Berkeley at the War Cabinet Office.

Yours sincerely,

(sd) W.L. Fraser.

J.R.Culpin, Esq.,
Ministry of Economic Warfare.

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I telephoned Mr. Rumbold at the Indie Office this afternoon on the question of the Afghanistan route for supplies to Russia. I explained to him that we had certain information which made it look probable that the Russians themselves had been making arrangements to develop this route from the Russian end. I asked him whether he would have any objection to our instructing the Embassy at Moscow to approach the Russian authorities on this question.

He said that the question was already being considered in the Indie Office and that although he thought the final conclusion would be such as to offer no objection to the use of this route, the matter was at the moment in the hands of his political and strategic advisors. He was, therefore, most anxious that the matter should not be immediately raised with the Russians and would prefer that the Russians were simply asked, in a general way, for their views on the routing of supplies. If, in their answer, they suggested the use of the Afghanistan route, as they doubtless would, we should probably by that time be in a position to approve it.

(SGD) J. STUART DANIEL.

PROFFESOR POSTAN.

2.7.41.

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Sir Stafford Cripps has telegraphed particulars as under of the Russians Shipping program in the Far East:-

- (a) with the request that cargoes be arranged
- (b) asking for names of ports to which vessels should proceed
- (c) and for agents to be appointed.

1. s.s. "ARCTICA". G.T. 2900

Now at Hong Kong, proceeding at once to Malaya. Full cargo of about 4500 tons of rubber and tin (as much as possible of tin).

2. s.s. "KRASNY PARTISAN." G.T. 2413.

Now at Hong Kong, due out July 10th. (4,500)

3. s.s. "KOMILES." G.T. 3962

Now at Vladivostok. (Shanghai 22/6 for Vladivostok). To load full cargo 6000 tons 28/6 at Calcutta (5-6 weeks).

4. s.s. "ASHKARAD". G.T. 5284.

Sailing from Vladivostok for Australia. Full cargo of merino wool 7500 tons. (5-6 weeks).

5. s.s. "KIM" ~~"KIROV"~~ G.T. 5114.

At San Francisco. 7500 tons preferably wool, if not solo leather to ship at San Francisco.

6. s.s. "WELLEN". G.T. 5135.

Hong Kong 15/7. Vladivostok 2-3 weeks. 7500 tons preferably rubber or wool.

The problem is therefore to arrange for cargoes of-

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1. Rubber and Tin.
 for "Arctica" in about 10 daya, Malaya of about 4500 tons
 for "Krasny Partisan" in about 20/25 days at
 Malay of about 3600 "
 for "Wollon" 2/3 weeks at Hong Kong, of
 about (rubber). 7500 "
 15,600 "
2. Wool (Merino).
 for "Ashkhabad" in about 5-6 weeks Australia 7,500 tons
 possibly
 "Wellen" q.v. up to 7,500 "
 "Kirov" q.v. up to 7,500 "
 immediately
3. Leothar (Sole).
 to load "Kirov" now at San Francisco if wool not
 available 7,500 "
4. Calcutta cargo.
 praasumably of Jute (possibly some Shelkao) of approx.
 600 tons in 5-6 weeks for s.a. "Komilaa."

J.R.Culpin
 2nd July, 1941.

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Thursday's Meeting

✓

LORD HANKEY.

SUPPLIES TO RUSSIA.

26

The main ~~problem~~ at this stage is to establish some kind of machinery for dealing with the whole problem. Various Departments have suggested that the best solution would be a somewhat elastic Informal Sub-Committee, consisting of members of your Committee and of the ~~Griff~~ Sub-Committee, which would meet as often as required. *Cost of* I have sent the Agenda for our Meeting, and copies of *Arfar* the various telegrams that have come in from Moscow, to a list of 28 recipients, including (in addition to yourself, the Vice-Chairman and Hasler) representatives of 16 Departments. The Informal Sub-Committee will clearly have to be much smaller (e.g. M.E.W., War Transport, Treasury, Foreign Office) with authority to call in any others whose co-operation is desired.

The Foreign Office are now instructing Moscow to send all telegrams having any bearing on supplies, inward or outward, and communications in a new series called "Mosby". Copies will come to you, to the Vice-Chairman and to me automatically, but they will only be circulated to the list of 28, or any revised list we may adopt, after consultation - just as in the case of Arfar telegrams, some of which are quite trivial and can be handled by M.E.W. acting independently.

A further problem is that of having an adequate Executive Organ to take action after Inter-Departmental decisions have been arrived at. In the case of Arfars, the primary responsibility rests with M.E.W. There is a general feeling, however, that they are not ideally placed to take such action as buying commodities, ordering ships about, or incurring expenditure. In the case of Greece the Executive Organ was Nicholson's Inter-Allied Section at the Ministry of War Transport. In the case of Turkey it is largely the U.K.C.C. In the case of the Middle East Supply Centre, which now co-ordinates the whole area, the Executive Organ is again Nicholson's Section, with a good deal of delegation to the U.K.C.C. The general feeling (especially of the Treasury) is that Nicholson's Section should take over the executive functions, in very close consultation with M.E.W. in the case of matters arising from Arfar telegrams. As regards Mosby telegrams, which come from the Foreign Office acting purely as a Post Office, ~~reference~~ *our hands* are much freer.

I enclose one or two papers which M.E.W. have given me, which throw some light on the question of supplies. I have also received some detailed information about specific commodities.

We shall also have to keep a close watch on the American end of the business. The newspapers report that the Russians are now putting in specific requests for supplies to the United States Administration. The Ministry of Food have already telegraphed to the British Food Mission in U.S.A. drawing attention to paragraph 2 of telegram No. 77. Arfar from Moscow and asking to be kept informed of developments at the other end.

Lord Hankey

2nd JULY, 1941.

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MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE COMMENTS ON TELEGRAM
77 ARMS FROM MOSCOW.

27

Russian requests invite the following observations:

- (a) Rubber 50-60,000 tons is about twice the estimated Russian deficiency for 1941. But presumably under war conditions their demand will increase very considerably. The enquiries which we have so far made in this country, in Singapore and America are based on the assumption that the Soviets will not require more than about 25,000 tons.
- (b) Agrees with our estimate of Soviet deficiencies.
- (c) Agrees with our estimate of Soviet deficiencies.
- (d) Is 20-30% above our estimate of Soviet deficiency which is about 18,000 tons. But again under war conditions they will probably want more jute than before.
- (e) & (f) Agrees with our estimates.
- (g) Somewhat in excess of our estimate of Soviet deficiency and at present we do not yet know whether any lead could be made available.
- (h) The situation is being investigated, but I very much doubt whether any aluminium could be made available.
- (i) Molybdenum concentrates being investigated and should probably be made available from American sources.
- (j) Is not much in excess of our estimate of Soviet deficiency and the position is being investigated.
- (k)
- (l) & (m) Being investigated.
- (n) Is a very strange request, for Russia has always been an exporter of indium, but it is just possible that they have oversold to Germany. Position being investigated.
- (o) & (p) Being investigated.
- (q) Is not a subject raised in our brief to Cadbury and I do not think we are competent to deal with it. Should be brought up independently before the Committee.

The subject discussed in paragraph 3 of the telegram is practicable but in India, as in all other matters, much will depend on the shipping situation and this will have to be investigated.

(Signed) M. POSTER.

1.7.41.

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T31/9/100/Z

MINUTES of Meeting held at Ministry of Economic Warfare at 12 noon on 24th June, 1941.

P R E S E N T:

Mr. J. M. Troutbeck	In the Chair
Mr. Postan	
Mr. Lincoln	M.E.W.
Mr. Byatt	
Sir John Campbell	Colonial Office
Mr. C. Figg	
Mr. Coote	Foreign Office
Mr. Thorley	Treasury
Mr. Levine	Ministry of Supply

In attendance:

Sir Stafford Cripps	
Mr. A. G. Pawson	Secretary of the I.R.R.C.

Mr. Troutbeck stated that the meeting had been convened with the object of arranging for the early supply of essential materials for the U.S.S.R., particularly tin and rubber.

Sir Stafford Cripps pointed out that it was essential for the Russian morale that we should give them precise and immediate promises of supplies.

Mr. Postan stated that the total annual requirements of the U.S.S.R. would probably be 25,000 tons of rubber and 8/12,000 tons of tin, and of these quantities 10,000 tons of rubber and 2,000 tons of tin were required immediately. He understood that the Soviet had four ships available in Hong Kong to carry the cargo. He thought that the 10,000 tons of rubber could be taken in two shipments.

Mr. Levine stated that the Ministry of Supply had ample rubber purchased in Malaya but that it was distributed over various ports, and the assistance of the U.S.A. would probably facilitate matters.

Sir John Campbell stated that the U.S.A. Government were nervous about their supply. They wished to build up a stock of 430,000 tons, but now their purchasing in Malaya was being confined to one buyer, it was thought that they would be able to obtain over 300,000 tons by the end of this year. The amount therefore required for Russia was infinitesimal and should present no difficulty.

Mr. Postan pointed out that in October last the U.S.A. Government expressed their readiness to re-adjust their ideas with the idea of helping Russia, and no doubt they would be prepared to do so under present circumstances.

Discussing tin, Sir John Campbell pointed out that owing to the high price in the East the U.S.A. had bought little or nothing since February. Any purchases would have to be made through commercial channels.

Mr. Thorley of the Treasury raised the question of payment. He pointed out that the Soviet had a very small sterling balance, probably not more than \$100,000, whereas the 2,000 tons of tin would cost approximately \$500,000. The Treasury would prefer payment in American dollars.

Mr. Lincoln pointed out that Basra being blocked, Vladivostok appeared to be the only possible route, but Mr. Postan stated that shipment could probably be made through Port Bandar Shahpour in the Persian Gulf.

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It was decided that a telegram should be drafted by M.E.W. for despatch by the Foreign Office to Washington after consultation with U.S.A. Embassy in London, asking for the co-operation of the State Department, and that the Ministry of Supply should endeavour to find out through commercial channels whether the necessary 2,000 tons of tin could be made available at once.

Mr. Lincoln said that he was seeing the Dutch that afternoon and would give them the gist of our decision, asking for their co-operation if necessary.

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✓ 10, Downing Street,
Whitehall.

3rd July, 1941.

SECRET

Dear Cairncross,

30

Would you please convey to Lord Hankey the Prime Minister's thanks for the notes enclosed in his minute of June 23rd, suggesting various ways of taking advantage of Hitler's attack on Soviet Russia.

Yours sincerely,

J. N. P. [Signature]

J. Cairncross, Esq.,
Duchy of Lancaster.

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rather

1900

2500

? Arctic


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I cannot ~~is~~ all this. Be truly informed.

H.

7. V 16. 41

OFFICES OF THE WAR CABINET
GREAT GEORGE STREET, S.W.1

N.
33

6th July, 1941.

Dear Lord Bunsby

I have sent the U.K.C.C.'s Report on Communications through Iran, and the map ~~map~~ that goes with it, to the Russian expert at M.E.W., who agreed at the last meeting of your Committee to supplement it with some information on the motor transport position in Iran.

I had thought that we might then prepare a rather shorter report on communications through Iran for circulation to your Committee.

... In the meantime, however, I have received ^{from F.O.} the attached documentation* prepared by the Transportation Branch at the War Office. You will see that it deals with a variety of issues and that Appendix B provides the framework of a comprehensive report on communications into Russia through all the available routes.

It might be possible to use this Appendix as the basis of a general report embodying recommendations, on the lines of the report on Communications in Irak (C.A.S.(41)164) which we recently addressed to the Chiefs of Staff with satisfactory results. The report would, of course, embody some of the information contained in the other War Office Papers, in the U.K.C.C.'s Report, etc.

We might, if you agree, begin the preparation of such a report soon, though we should need

*This copy has been extracted from a Foreign Office file and is the only one in existence, except for one on which the War Office is working.

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the assistance of the Transportation Branch at the War Office, and therefore, I think, a recommendation by your Committee to which A.C.I.G.S. had subscribed.

I am not certain, however, that the time is yet come for submitting such a report to the Chiefs of Staff for the following reasons:-

- (a) Supplies have barely started moving towards Russia, ~~starting~~ to Vladivostok only, and we have little idea of the volume of supplies which we shall be able to build up.
- (b) The prospects of utilising Russian shipping are still very obscure.
- (c) As regards the route through Iran, and while we are seeking information (e.g. as to the possibility of obtaining locomotives and rolling stock from North or South America, as to the advisability of appointing a U.K.C.C. Transport expert in Iran, etc.) very little can be done until the Iranian attitude becomes clearer. The last telegram I saw showed that the Iranians, although still vehemently anti-Soviet, were beginning to think that they would be wise to take out some re-insurance. They will have to evolve considerably before we can utilise their territory to supply Russia, and the Foreign Office are keeping a close watch on the position.

My general suggestion is, therefore, that we should begin to prepare our documentation so as to be ready with a draft report which your Committee can address to the

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Chiefs of Staff when the unknown factors referred to in (a) (b) and (c) above have become less obscure. I should be grateful for your instructions. 35

Yours sincerely
Arthur Hankey

Lord Hankey, P.C., G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O.,
 Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster,
 55, Whitehall,
 S.W.1.

Russell

3 men after

36

7th July, 1941.

My dear Hankey,

The draft telegram you sent to me, and which I now return, is entirely satisfactory if you will make the slight alterations I have marked on it.

The North American Committee, of which I am Chairman, deals with these issues in the United States. And I hope in future you will consult me before you come to any decision yourself.

Yours sincerely,

Blum

The Rt. Hon. Lord Hankey, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.,
G.C.V.O.,
55 Whitehall, London, S. W. 1.

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MOST IMMEDIATE

37

Your telegrams Nos. 3668 and 3669 (of 4th August: supplies for Russia from U.S.A.)

In view of difficulties mentioned in my telegram No. 4400 (of 4th August) which crossed your telegram referred to above War Cabinet feel strongly that we must not be committed ^{in present circumstances} ~~at this moment~~ to the establishment of a three-man Committee. The recent meetings in Washington have taken place in the absence of two out of the three proposed members, and we cannot take any decision for or against the Committee until the question of the Terms of Reference and procedure have been discussed with Mr. Hopkins and Mr. Purvis, ~~(if the latter can return to Washington in time.)~~ * In these discussions full weight should be given to the practical difficulties mentioned in my telegrams Nos. 4212 and 4400, as well as to the considerations set forth in paragraphs 4 and 7 of your telegram 3668.

Meanwhile we must urge strongly that figures of United States production should not be given to the Russians. While anxious to give all possible help to Russia it is vital that this should not be done at the expense of our own essential supplies. It must not be forgotten that Russians have been preparing for many years and that we still have a dangerous leeway to make up.

* Proposed revision.

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v 38

Ministry of Economic Warfare,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
London, W.1

7th July 1941.

Dear Fairbairn,

Many thanks for your letter of July 2nd regarding the possibility of our obtaining supplies of carbonyl from the Russians. We discussed the question with Hall of your London Office, and have in consequence despatched a telegram to Moscow asking whether the Russians would be able to offer 25 to 50 tons.

If anything comes of this the questions of shipment and price can be discussed later. The details of the transaction would be taken over by the U.K.C.C., with whom you are no doubt in touch.

Yours sincerely,

E.G. Fairburn Esq.
W/Supply,
Raw Mats. Dept.,
NARWICK.

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R.D. Coote Esq., Foreign Office. ✓

Capt. C.B. Berkley, Cabinet Offices.

Sir K. Origg, Room 202, War Office.

W.L. Fraser, Treasury.

R.M. Nicholson, Ministry of War
Transport.

R.L. Hall, Esq., Ministry Supply,
Steel House.

G.W. Turner, Ministry Supply,
Adelphi.

The Lord Hankey, 55 Whitehall, S.W.1.

R.W. Jones, U.K.C.O.

key

V38

39
ANNEX I.

PRECIS OF TELEGRAM FROM WASHINGTON TO U.S.A. EMBASSY IN LONDON.

There will be submitted to the President on July 21st specific proposals which have been drafted regarding supplies to Russia. It is contemplated in these proposals:

- (1) That a small number of pursuit planes be supplied at once, taken from U.S. stocks and British aeroplanes at present awaiting shipment, with further quantities following in 1942.
- (2) With reference to bombing planes, deliveries starting in April next year, but no supply immediately.
- (3) A small shipment now of anti-aircraft guns, to be followed by monthly allotments next winter of amounts up to 50.
- (4) A delivery of 2,000 tons of petrol to be taken from American and British stocks and to be followed by shipments from American production of 2,000 per month.
- (5) Sale of aeroplanes gasoline and lubricants at once, in the amounts requested.
- (6) The release of approximately one-third of the requested raw materials.
- (7) Approval of the sale of approximately half the requested total of complete industrial plants for the production of munitions.
- (8) Partial approval of the desired lease of equipment for industrial plants and for machine tools.
- (9) Approval of other orders subject in each case to acceptance from Government Agencies.

With reference to the 6th, 7th and 8th proposals the principle is introduced as compulsory selective release, it being impossible to obtain unanimous agreement relative to any of these numbered categories. The selections of the Executive Decent Aid Reports in each category would be obligatory up to the percentage approved, up to the total monetary value involved.

Representatives of the Soviet Union have not been informed of these proposals. It seems from a conference with Purvis Harris and Dewar that the British are strongly opposed to any delivery of bombers to Russia immediately, although the Russian Authorities themselves regard this request as being of greater urgency than any of the other items concerned.



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ANNEX II.

PRECIS OF TELEGRAM TO WASHINGTON FROM U.S.A. EMBASSY
IN LONDON.

With reference to pursuit planes, will you please let us know the number and type which it is being planned to transfer to the Soviet Union immediately, and the division of these planes as between the United States and Great Britain. Please inform us also what raw materials are being released, and the amounts. Some commitments have been made by the British for immediate releases of wool, jute, rubber, tin, lead and British Army boots. It is not to be assumed, however, that the amounts of these will meet the full requests of the Soviet Union; but no commitments should be made with regard to any of these items without first consulting Mr. Purvie, who is being kept informed currently as to commitments on the part of Great Britain.

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Copy sent to - S.S. for Air.
Captain C.M. Berkeley.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

I attach a copy of a minute to the Prime Minister enclosing a note about aircraft and anti-aircraft guns for Russia.

I am sorry I have not been able to sign the note - or even read it since dictating it - because I have to rush off to another meeting at the Ministry of Labour with Mr. Harry Hopkins.

I should be glad if you would try and obtain a decision from the War Cabinet on this subject this afternoon, as I doubt if we can make a proposal of this magnitude with War Cabinet approval.

(Sgd.) HANKEY.

24th July, 1941.

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SECRET.

WAR CABINET.

COMMITTEE FOR THE CO-ORDINATION OF ALLIED SUPPLIES.

RUSSIAN SUPPLIES.

42

Note by the Chairman.

In accordance with instructions from the War Cabinet (W.M. (41) 72, Conclusion 2) I saw Mr. Hopkins and Mr. Harrimen at the American Embassy this afternoon. I was accompanied by Sir Edward Grigg, the Vice Chairman, and Captain Berkeley, the Secretary, of the War Cabinet Committee for the Co-ordination of Allied Supplies. The subject of our conversation was supplies to the U.S.S.R.

2. At the outset Mr. Hopkins handed me a telegram he had just received from Washington which I read aloud. The telegram said that a proposal was to be put up to President Roosevelt on the 21st July, the principal points of which were as follows:

- (1) that a certain number of fighter aircraft produced in the U.S.A. were to be sent at once to Russia, being drawn partly from existing United States machines and partly from British supplies;
- (2) that bombers would be sent, beginning next April;
- (3) that the raw materials would be met to the extent of 50 per cent. so far as practicable, but no details were given, either of the items, or of the times within which they were to be delivered.

3. I replied at once that, while in principle we were most anxious to help the Russians, I could not accept any commitment in the matter of aircraft without consulting higher authority - this line being accordance with a message I had received from the Secretary of State for Air just before starting for the meeting. I asked that, if possible, particulars should be furnished on this head.

4. Mr. Hopkins, who had evidently anticipated some such reply, then read the draft of a telegram which he proposed to send to Washington, asking for particulars about the fighters; how many were to be at the expense of the U.S.A. and how many

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at our expense, and to which, at our request, he added the actual types.

5. We then discussed raw materials, and I told him that to the best of my knowledge we had already undertaken to despatch from ports in the Far East to Vladivostok in Russian ships a certain amount of rubber, tin and lead. A Russian ship was proceeding to Australia to fetch wool and, in addition, I was under the impression that supplies of wheat were under consideration. I said that, in reply to the request for top boots, we did not manufacture those but could send a certain number of ankle boots, and that inquiries were being made from India and possibly from South Africa in this connection. Other possible supplies were under discussion, but there were some articles which we could not possibly supply, notably aluminium. Cobalt was a difficulty, and we were in consultation with the British Purchasing Commission in Washington on the subject.

6. Mr. Hopkins then sent for a stenographer and redictated his telegram to include our points, adding the gist of what I had said about raw materials and civilian supplies. He included also a mention of the fact that the British Purchasing Commission is being kept informed of what we are arranging to supply.

7. I asked Mr. Hopkins to let me have a reply, if possible, before the meeting of the Committee for the Co-ordination of Allied Supplies on Thursday at 11 a.m., which he thought should be practicable.

8. We raised the question of shipping, pointing out that Vladivostok was the best port but that obviously at the present time this route was precarious. Mr. Hopkins agreed, but thought we must make our arrangements on the basis of the existing situation. I said that no British ships were being

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allowed to proceed to Vladivostok. Mr. Hopkins said that there were 12 Russian ships in port on the west coast of America ready to sail for Vladivostok.

9. I then alluded briefly to the Persian Gulf route emphasizing its limitations, and Mr. Harriman said that this route could only be used by American ships at the expense of materials shipped to the Middle East.

(Sgd.) HARKNEY.

55. Whitehall, S.W.1.

22nd July, 1941.

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Russia

45

Supply of Mines and Depth Charges to Russia.

A requirement has arisen to supply Russia with 1,000 mines and 4,000 depth charges. Of these about 200 mines and 1,000 depth charges have already been shipped and it is desired to prepare the balance* as soon as possible.

The proposal is that a ship, or ships, should be taken up now, filled with the outstanding stores and proceed to northern port to await an opportunity for sailing to North Russia. Orders as regards sailing will be given by the Naval staff.

It is desirable that this large consignment of explosives should be carried in two bottoms and a further requirement probably is that the ship, or ships, selected shall be able to make the round trip to and from N. Russia without the necessity of refuelling. Information is requested as to whether the War Office or Air Ministry have any outstanding requirements to fulfil, it being understood that any stores embarked may remain in the N. port referred to for some time.

It is also desired to know to what extent the Air Ministry can supply parachutes for the mines in question.

(Initialed) C.H.

23rd July, 1941.

* About 2,000 tons cargo space.

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1. RUBBER.

① Demand 50-60,000

The Russians have asked for 50,000 to 60,000 tons.

② This year, 25,000 tons
U.S. Buyers Conf.
rec'd

We have agreed to supply about 25,000 tons in the course of the year, but in order to do this the co-operation of U.S. buyers is necessary. After consultation with the American Embassy in London, a telegram was sent to the British Embassy, Washington, informing them that we may have to ask for temporary release from stocks held by American buyers in the Far East. In the meantime we have agreed to provide immediately about 10,000 tons.

③ Immediately
10,000 tons④ Already
distributed
2,651 tons

The Russian s.s. "Volga" sailed for Vladivostok on 20th July with 2,651 tons; another 4,000 tons will be loaded on the Russian s.s. "Arctika" which sailed for Singapore on 8th July, and further quantities are being prepared for loading.

2. TIN.

Demand 8-10,000 tons

The Russians have asked for 8,000 to 10,000 tons of tin.

① This year 8,000
U.S. Buyers Conf.
N.E.

We have agreed to supply about 8,000 tons in the course of the year. The same considerations as for rubber hold good for tin, and the co-operation of the United States was asked in the same telegram.

② 1,000 tons +
500 from N.E.

The "Volga" carried 500 tons of tin from Malaya when she sailed on 20th July, and 500 tons of tin are ready for the "Arctika."

③ 500 tons ready
1000 tons to be loaded

The N.E.I. Government have agreed to release 500 tons of tin to be loaded by Russian s.s. "Krasny Partizan."

3. WOOL.

Demand 15,000-20,000 tons

The Russians have asked for 15,000 to 20,000 tons.

① Whole can be supplied
from Empire sources② S.S. "Ashkabad" on
voyage to Australia

The whole of this can be undertaken from Empire sources. 25,000 bales of scoured or washed merino wool and 10,000 bales of greasy merino are available in Australia, and about 30,000 bales of crossbred have been earmarked in New Zealand. No more wool will be available in Australia or New Zealand until the next clip in November. The Russian s.s. "Ashkabad" sailed from Vladivostok on 7th July for Sydney to load wool, and other ships will soon follow her.

4. JUTE.

The Russians asked for 25,000 tons.

Demand 25,000 tons

① Can be supplied
from India② One ship will load
25,000 bales at
Calcutta, Aug. 7th

The whole of this can be supplied from India. 25,000 bales are to be shipped to the Persian Gulf by British s.s. "Egorlock" arriving at Calcutta on 7th August. An additional 30,000 bales can be made available for the Russian s.s. "Wellen", which is still under repair in Hongkong.

5. LEAD.

The Russians asked for 30,000 to 40,000 tons of lead.

Demand 30-40,000 tons

① Can be met from
Empire sources② 13,000 tons already
ordered

It appears that all this can be supplied from Empire sources. The Russian s.s. "Maxim Gorki" is leaving Shanghai for Rangoon on 25th or 26th July to load 1,000 tons of lead. The Russian s.s. "Ashkabad" is going to load 2,000 tons of lead from Port Pirie on her way to Sydney.

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6. SHELLAC.*No difficulty*

The Russians asked for 1,000 tons of shellac. There will be no difficulty in providing all this from India.

7. SOLE LEATHER.*See also No. 11
13 ref*

The Russians asked for 5,000 to 6,000 tons of sole leather.

A little can be supplied from South Africa, but some will probably have to come from South America, where United States co-operation will be necessary.

8. ALUMINIUM.*Difficult**Some can be sent*

The Russians have asked for 30,000 to 40,000 tons, and set the greatest store by this request in order to keep their aircraft factories going. Their own production is at the rate of 80,000 tons a year, but 50,000 tons of this comes from plants in the danger area near Leningrad and Kiev.

Despite the great scarcity of aluminium in this country, the Ministry of Aircraft Production hope to be able to set aside about 1,000 tons a month from October, subject to the signing of the Canadian contract and our shipping losses remaining low, and provided the U.S. Government would be prepared to do the same.

9. CORAL.*Difficult by solar
at sea*

The Russians have asked for 150 to 200 tons.

50 tons are being supplied at once from this country, and 15 tons have already been shipped. Further supplies depend on releases from U.S.A., but Washington reported that the supply position was going to be very difficult and that it would probably be impossible to meet Russian requirements in full.

10. INDUSTRIAL DIAMONDS.*Meet current
requirements but
cannot build up
stock*

The Russians have asked for \$2 million worth.

We have told them that we shall probably be able to supply their current requirements, but that it will not be possible for us to help them to build up stocks.

Details are being discussed between S.T.R. and U.K.C.C.

11. MILITARY BOOTS.*Can be met at once*

The Russians have asked for 3 million pairs of high military boots.

It has been agreed with the Trade Delegation that ankle boots should be sent, and up to 2-3 million pairs will soon be available in this country. The Soviet Trade Delegation have asked if supplies would be available from the Empire, instead of the U.K. and enquiries are being made about this.

12. COPPER.

The Russians have asked for 40,000 to 50,000 tons of copper.

All world sources are earmarked by this country and the U.S.A. No supplies will be available from U.K., but we are awaiting a reply from Washington on availability of supplies from U.S.A.



13. ROLLED BRASS FOR CARTRIDGES.

The Russians have asked for 15,000 to 20,000 tons.

Most of this will have to come from the U.S.A. and a telegram has been sent to Washington giving the specification of the Russian requirements. We are awaiting a reply.

14. MOLYBDENUM CONCENTRATES.

The Russians have asked for 4,000 tons.

We are awaiting a reply from Washington on the availability of supplies from U.S.A.

15. WOOLLEN CLOTH.

The Russians have asked for 10 million metres, preferably khaki.

This can be supplied from the U.K. Specifications arrived from Moscow on the 23rd July and are being considered.

16. IRIDIUM.

The Russians have asked for 50 kilograms.

1,000 oz. are being released at once by the Ministry of Aircraft Production, and it is hoped that a further 700 oz. will be available in 6 months.

17. MACHINE TOOLS.

The Russians have asked for an unspecified amount of miscellaneous machine tools.

We have informed Sir Stafford Cripps that there was little likelihood of our being able to supply any machine tools at all and this has apparently been brought to the notice of the Soviets. It has since transpired that in certain limited fields U.K. stocks and production of machine tools is sufficiently abundant to permit some exports, if necessary. These, however, cannot be expected to be on a large scale.

18. FOODSTUFFS.

The Russians asked for unspecified quantities of wheat, sugar, meat, canned meat, and rice, to be delivered to Vladivostok in order to relieve pressure on the Trans-Siberian Railway.

The supplies of most of these foodstuffs can easily be made available, but as the Russians themselves appear to regard these requirements as of secondary importance, the shortage of shipping may prevent us from delivering them *in good quantities*.

24.7.41.

Reference - CAB 63/156

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WHITEHALL 3400

Copy sent to - The S.S. for Foreign Affairs.
" S.S. for Air.
Captain C.M. Berkelsy.

Thurs 19

PRIME MINISTER

49

I attach an urgent note about Russian supplies.
I have not been able to sign it or even to see it as I have
to go to an urgent meeting on another matter at the Ministry
of Labour with Mr. Harry Hopkins.

24th July, 1941.

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SECRET.

24th July, 1941.

RUSSIAN SUPPLIES.

Note by the Paymaster-General.

50

In accordance with the instructions of the War Cabinet on July 21st (W.C.(41) 72nd Conclusions, Minute 2) I saw Mr. Harry Hopkins and Mr. Harrison on Tuesday, 22nd July. I was accompanied by Sir Edward Brigg, Vice-Chairman, and Captain Berkeley, Secretary of the War Cabinet Committee for the Co-ordination of Allied Supplies. Mr. Hopkins handed me a telegram containing proposals that were to have been submitted to President Roosevelt on July 21st. A paraphrase is attached (Annexe I).

2. The proposals were lacking in detail, and at my request Mr. Hopkins telegraphed at once to ask for particulars - paraphrase attached (Annexe II).

AIRCHART.

3. The Committee for the Co-ordination of Allied Supplies met this morning (July 24th). The Air Ministry's representative reported that the Secretary of State was willing to make the following offer:-

140 Tomahawks, which are already in the United Kingdom, to be sent to Archangel, but without spare parts or ground equipment.

60 Tomahawks to be sent to Vladivostok from British supplies now in the U.S.A. awaiting shipment to the Middle East.

TOTAL - 200 Fighters.

4.

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4. The Government of the U.S.A. to be responsible for sending to Archangel via Vladivostok -

- (1) All spares and ground equipment for the whole of the 200 fighters (e.g. 140 Tomahawks from the United Kingdom and 60 from the U.S.A.).
- (2) Experts in sufficient numbers to enable the Russians to erect the aircraft and to teach them to fly and maintain the machines.

5. The representative of the Air Ministry was not in a position to give any information about the proposal to send bombers to Russia next April.

6. The question of payment will have to be considered.

ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS.

7. We require a few more details before a decision can be given on the question of anti-aircraft guns, for example, how many are to be heavy and how many light? We ourselves have been pressing for A.A. heavy type guns for some time for the Middle East, and Brigadier Whiteley of the Middle East Command recently visited the U.S.A. to develop this and other requests. He was only accorded 23 guns of old types.

8. We have also asked for 12 90 cm. guns for use here for training purposes.

9. The remainder of Mr. Hopkins' proposals must await the details for which he has asked.

10. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of State for Air propose to hold a meeting this evening with representatives of the Russian Government now in this country, as well as with Mr. Hopkins and Mr. Harriman.

It

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It is probably not worth while to hold such a meeting unless the War Cabinet will approve the proposals of the Air Ministry as set forth above and authorise us to mention them to the meeting.

11. I submit the question for decision.

(Signed) HANCOCK.

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53

Prime Minister,

Supplies to Russia.

.... I attach a draft which gives the raw material for the personal telegram which you propose to send to M. Stalin about this afternoon's decision on the above subject.

I have avoided giving the actual amounts of the raw materials we are hoping to send, but as a matter of fact they will form a substantial proportion of the Russian demands, and America should be able to send a good deal of the balance.

24th July, 1941.



MINISTRY OF SUPPLY,
THE ADELPHI,
LONDON, W.C. 2.

24th July, 1941.

SECRET AND URGENT

54

Dear Lord Hankey,

I have discussed with our Explosives Production Department the question of the release of 2,000 tons of Toluol by the U.S. Government for Russia. They confirm what I said at the meeting, that they are anxious that no shipments of Toluol should be made to Russia which would affect the supply of raw material for the manufacture of T.N.T. in the U.S.A. for our stocks, in view of our greatly increased requirements for bombs, etc. At the moment, however, we are not asking for shipments of Toluol to this country for the manufacture of explosives in this country, and subject to what is said above, they would not wish to offer objection to shipment to Russia.

I am sending copies of this letter to Berkeley and Hasler.

Yours sincerely,

G. F. Butler.

The Right Hon. Lord Hankey, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O.,
55, Whitehall,
London, S.W.1.

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guthrie

55

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24th July, 1941.

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56
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AIR.

... I enclose a copy of the raw material for the Prime Minister telegram to Monsieur Stalin. Do you agree? Please ask your Private Secretary to inform Cairncross. I am trying to see Harry Hopkins tonight to let me know how matters stand.

24TH JULY, 1941.

Following personal message from Prime Minister to Monsieur Stalin.

I am glad to inform you that the War Cabinet have decided to send to Russia as soon as possible 200 Tomahawk Fighter Aeroplanes. 140 of these will be sent from here to Archangel and 60 from our supplies in the United States of America. Details as to spare parts and American personnel to erect the machines have still to be arranged with the American Government.

Up to two to three million pairs of ankle boots should shortly be available in this country for shipment. We are also arranging to provide during the present year large quantities of rubber, tin, wool and woollen cloth, jute, lead and shellac. All your other requirements from raw materials are receiving careful consideration. Where supplies are impossible or limited from here we are discussing with the United States of America.

Details will of course be communicated to the usual official channels.

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55,

Russia

SECRET.

25th July, 1941.

58

Dear Fraser,

In reply to your letter of the 25th July, with which you enclosed a copy of a telegram from Cripps No.179 ARPAB with regard to payments arrangements with Russia, as well as your draft reply, I want to make one or two observations.

My conversations with Mr. Hopkins and Mr. Harriman yesterday did not get very far. Mr. Hopkins did not receive, within the expected time, a reply to his telegram to Washington asking for precise details of the proposals they had sent him, and in view of the large amount of ground he had to cover here he said we had better communicate direct with Washington.

The War Cabinet approved the proposals as regards aircraft for Russia, after which Mr. Hasler sent a telegram to Purvis which will be put into circulation. I understand that the Prime Minister also sent a telegram to Monsieur Stalin giving our intentions in broad outline.

In my Report to the War Cabinet yesterday I mentioned that "the question of payment will have to be considered". I think that your telegram can be considered as the first step in exploring the question of payment.

I presume that your paragraph 40 is all right from the point of view of the Service and Supply Departments, but you will know this better than me.

Subject to the above remarks I concur in your draft telegram.

Yours sincerely,

W.L. Fraser, Esq.,
H.M. TREASURY.

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Plum
Tolson 59

25th July, 1941.

SECRET

Dear Hasler,

With reference to my letter to Lord Hankey yesterday about the Toluel for Russia, I now see from 482 Apure that the U.S. proposal is not, as I had gathered at the meeting, to send one shipment of 2,000 tons, but to send 2,000 tons now from British and American stocks, to be followed by 2,000 tons a month from U.S. production.

This is rather a different picture, and our Explosives Department, while they still do not feel justified in actively opposing the suggestion made by the U.S. Government, think that in view of the size of this diversion it is important that we should enter a ~~query~~ on the lines indicated in my yesterday's letter - viz, that we hope that the U.S. Government will ensure that any shipments to Russia will not prejudice supply to our own requirements in the U.S. for the manufacture of T.N.T. They would be glad if a charger could be sent to AIRUS 482 to this effect.

I am sending copies of this to Lord Hankey and to Berkeley.

Yours sincerely,

G. F. SEEL

W. J. Hasler, Esq.,
Office of the War Cabinet,
Great George Street,
London, S.W.1.

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60

Your Reference

Treasury Reference



TREASURY CHAMBERS,
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
LONDON, S.W.1.

25th July, 1941

Dear Lord Hankey,

I send you enclosed copy of telegram from Cripps No. 179 Arfar with regard to the payments arrangements with Russia.

I also send you copy of my draft reply and would like to draw your particular attention to paragraph 4, and especially as to whether I have your approval to mention the question of goods of American manufacture being released. I believe you have had conversations with Mr. Hopkins and Mr. Harriman on the subject and I want to be careful to know that you are in agreement with what we suggest saying to Moscow.

As Cripps has asked for an expeditious handling of the reply, I should be grateful if you would let me know your views as soon as possible to-day.

Yours sincerely,

W. F. Rose

The Rt. Hon. Lord Hankey,
G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O.,
55, Whitehall, S.W.1.

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61 26

SECRET.

COPY OF A TELEGRAM DATED 23RD JULY, 1941
FROM SIR S. CRIPPS, MOSCOW TO MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE.

No. 179 ARFAR.

R. 4.25 a.m. 24th July, 1941

IMMEDIATE.

Mosby.

Foreign Office telegram No. 849.

Your proposals were handed to Mikoyan 20th July and he gave his answer to Cadbury to-day.

2. He agreed that credit should only apply to balance of clearing and to pay 40% in dollars.

3. He suggested however three alternatives.

(a) in place of our proposal that buyer should carry his own losses in transit he asked that His Majesty's Government should insure Soviet vessels and cargoes against war and marine risks at reasonable rates by which he seems to mean standard rates less a sizeable rebate. I shall be grateful for your comments on the proposal and for an indication on rates you could quote.

(b) Interest to be at 3% instead of $3\frac{1}{2}\%$.

(c) He insisted that what he wanted was a five year credit and not a three year credit with payments spread over five years. He proposed credits should be repaid in five equal annual instalments at the end of the third and subsequent years.

4. He indicated that if agreement could be reached on the above points our other proposals should not cause any difficulty.

5. I regard it as valuable concession that he has agreed to pay 40% cash in dollars when we were prepared to accept only one third and you may therefore feel able to meet his desire for a longer term credit and a lower rate of interest.

6. I submit the following alternatives for your consideration.

(a) to agree to his proposals of dates of payments but to retain interest at $3\frac{1}{2}\%$ (b) to take repayment in one sum at the end of 5 years, retaining interest at $3\frac{1}{2}\%$ (c) to take payment in seven equal annual instalments at the end of the first and subsequent years and to agree to interest at 3%. This would meet him halfway over term of credit and wholly on rate of interest.

7. I feel that (c) would be the most desirable from our point of view. Please let me know your opinion. I should however be grateful for authority to settle on (a).

8. Mikoyan was evidently anxious to reach some agreement as soon as possible and is preparing a draft text for our next meeting. A reply is therefore expeditious.

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DRAFT TELEGRAM TO SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS, MOSCOW

DISCLOSE

MOSEY

Your telegram 179 Arfar

1. We are pleased to note paragraph 2 of your telegram under reference.
2. We agree in any case that interest should be charged at 3%.
3. Unless you can obtain agreement upon a credit repayable in seven annual instalments as suggested in paragraph 6(e) of your telegram you are authorized to accept Wilkman's proposals for repayment, i.e. by five equal annual instalments commencing at the end of the third year, say on July 31st 1944.
4. These arrangements should cover not only the supplies to be handled by the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation but also deliveries by the Service Departments, excluding however any releases of American manufacture which might be decided upon.
5. The position as regards insurance mentioned in Paragraph 3(a) of your telegram is more difficult and is as follows:-

(a) As regards cargoes, the Government War Risks Insurance Office have in fact assisted in the insurance of these cargoes, accepting such part of the value as cannot be placed in the open market by reason of the size of the insurance.

(b) As regards ships, the War Risks Insurance Office would be willing to consider insurance of hulls, subject to agreement in regard to the value insured. ^{Insurance} We suggest that the Russians' Representatives who are here in London should communicate with the War Risks Insurance Office, who will explain the full position. ^{A comprehensive arrangement regarding insurance of hulls}

(c) The rates which the War Risks Insurance Office are quoting and accepting are not and this is their practice for all business, even for British vessels.

6. A Draft Heads of Agreement will be forwarded to you by bag as early as possible setting out our suggestions on the technical operation of the account.

Should be connected with the satisfactory development of plans for collaboration in shipping matters.

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Copies sent to:-

55, 63

Rear-Admiral Hermon-Hodge, Admiralty.
SECRET. Captain Berkeley, War Cabinet. 26th July, 1941.

Dear Haslar,

May I call your attention to the Minutes of the 28th Meeting of the Committee for the Co-ordination of Allied Supplies (C.A.S.(41) 28th Meeting, Page 2, Conclusion (iv)(b)) where the Committee "noted that the Chairman would make inquiries in the appropriate quarter as to -

- (a)
- (b) Possible Russian demands for naval equipment in the United States.

I could not get anything out of Harry Hopkins about (b). Would you kindly send a telegram to the Purvis Mission informing them that we have received some naval demands and asking whether they know of any Russian demands for such equipment in the United States?

Yours sincerely,

P.S. I am most grateful for your help on Thursday evening.

W.J. Haslar, Esq.,
Offices of the WAR CABINET.

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✓
Great George Street
~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

64

26th July, 1941.

Dear Lord Hankey,

Thank you for your letter of 26th July about Conclusion (iv)(b) of the 28th Meeting of the C.A.S. Committee.

I have sent a telegram to Purvis asking for information and at the same time letting him know what we have done as regards mine and depth charges which are, I understand, the only naval demands made here. I have also taken this opportunity of putting in a word about toluol, as requested by Seel.

The telegram will be sent to you as soon as it has been distributed.

Yours sincerely,

W. J. Hasler

The Rt. Hon. Lord Hankey, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.O.V.O.,
55, Whitehall,
S.W.1.

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OFFICES OF THE WAR CABINET
GREAT GEORGE STREET, S.W.1

27th July, 1941. 65

Dear Lord Hankey,

I telephoned Washington last night to know what progress was being made on Russian requirements. I spoke to Mr. Pinsent one of the Secretaries of the Supply Council who is, I know, concerned with this question. I told him that the matter of aircraft supplies, ~~with the Russians~~ in particular, was being dealt with here on a very high level and that we were being pressed for a reply to our telegram Apsure 482 on this matter. He told me that on their side also this question was being handled only in the highest quarters and unfortunately the people with whom they had most contact were not being kept informed. He promised, however, to let us have a reply either in our series of telegrams or from Air Marshal Farrie to the Air Ministry. I pointed out that what we wanted to know first of all was whether the Americans would provide spare parts and ground equipment, without which our offer of fighters would be useless.

As regards raw materials and industrial equipment, Pinsent said that the Americans had been very slow to get going with Russian requirements, - this was largely because the Russians had not given them any specific war-time list of requirements and (all they had was a miscellaneous collection of orders on which the Russians had placed at various times in the past, and had not been able to place owing to restrictions on export to Russia). Now, however, a special man had been appointed to look after the Russian requirements (see Washington telegram 3471 paragraph 2) and he thought they would get moving. A meeting had been arranged for next Monday to discuss aluminium on which he thought that something could be done, although there could be no question of immediate supplies.

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66 :

I am sending copies of this to Villiers and
Berkeley.

Yours sincerely,

W. J. Hasler

P.S. I am keeping Sir Archibald Sinclair's Secretary informed.
WTH

The Right Hon.

Lord Hankey, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O.,
Paymaster-General.

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Rubber ✓

OFFICES OF THE WAR CABINET
GREAT GEORGE STREET, S.W.1

SECRET.

28th July, 1941. 67

Lord Hankey

A Meeting was held here this afternoon under Sir Edward Grigg's Chairmanship at which the following decisions were taken:

1. The Rubber Control are prepared to release 10,000 tons of rubber (of types corresponding to Russian needs as reported to us by Sir Frank Nixon, who had consulted the Soviet Trade Delegation) from stocks in this country. The Ministry of War Transport have taken note that this quantity will have to be replaced over the next few months.
2. Certain naval and other supplies are, as you know, being assembled for loading on British ships which are to proceed to the north and await a suitable naval opportunity for conveying to a North Russian port. The Ministry of War Transport have agreed to increase the number of ships (probably from three to five) so as to allow the transport of this quantity of 10,000 tons of rubber.
3. Detailed arrangements are centralised with Mr. Justice in the Director of Sea Transport's Department at the Ministry of War Transport. The intention is that the five ships should be fully loaded with the rubber and other supplies within one week or at the most ten days. They will then proceed northward to await Admiralty instructions.

I concur,

Subject to your concurrence I propose to circulate a record of these arrangements as a C.A.S. Paper, but to make no reference in this Paper to the Prime Minister's intervention as reported to you in Sir Edward Bridges' letter of this morning. As it happens, a Russian request which is clearly the same as that conveyed to the Prime Minister by M. Stalin is conveyed in Telegram No. 180

/Anfar

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68

2 min Arfar Mossy from Moscow, which I circulated this morning. It would therefore be convenient to pin the present arrangements on to this Telegram and to conduct any correspondence with Moscow (that may be required) in the Arfar Mossy series. I am asking Sir Edward Bridges for his concurrence in these arrangements.

Embuteley

A copy of this note has gone to Sir E. Bridges for his concurrence in the last paragraph, and in anticipation of your report to him.

Many thanks. I attach a Minute I have sent to the Prime Minister, with also a letter to Bridges covering the same. Please see that a reply is sent over the Arfar-Mossy series.

The Rt. Hon. Lord Hankey.

H.

28. VII. 61

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J. 69

MOST SECRET.

28th July, 1941.

Dear Lord Hankey,

I understand that a copy of telegram 865 from Moscow to the Foreign Office about the supply of rubber is being sent to you. I enclose a copy herewith.

The Prime Minister has also sent a reply to M. Stalin, of which the first paragraph reads as follows:-

"* * * * *

1. Rubber. We will deliver the goods from here or United States by the best and quickest routes. Please say exactly what kind of rubber and which way you wish it to come. Preliminary orders are already given.

* * * * *

The Prime Minister has read this reply to the First Sea Lord, and has asked him to look into the shipping aspect, suggesting the possibility of the despatch of the rubber via Archangel, on the assumption that it might be spared from this country.

I have been asked by the Prime Minister to invite you to arrange for the necessary enquiries about the supply of rubber to Russia to be put in hand at once.

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28th July, 1941.

My dear Bridges,

Rubber for Russia.

Immediately on receipt of your letter about telegram 865 from Moscow to the Foreign Office about the supply of rubber for Russia, I put in hand the necessary inquiries.

A meeting is taking place this afternoon under the Chairmanship of Sir Edward O'Loghlin, and I hope to let you have a reply Tuesday morning.

I could not take this meeting myself because I was booked for the meeting on the Hovde plan. Grigg, however, is Vice-Chairman of my Committee for the Co-ordination of Allied Supplies and Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Civil Supplies, and knows all about the subject.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Berkeley.

Yours sincerely,

Sir Edward Bridges, KCB, MC

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WHITEHALL 300.

Rubber

Copy sent to Capt. Berkeley.
and Lord Beaverbrook.

55, Whitehall, 72

S.W.1.

SECRET.

29th July, 1941.

My dear Bridges,

I enclose a copy of a Minute about Rubber for Russia which I have sent to the Prime Minister. It is based on Berkeley's Minute to me, of which you have received a copy.

I agree with Berkeley that it would be convenient to pin the present arrangements to Telegram No.180 ARFAR MOSSY from Moscow, and to conduct any further correspondence with Moscow on this subject in the ARFAR MOSSY series.

Yours ever,

Sir Edward Bridges, KCB., MC.,
Offices of the WAR CABINET.

Thurs 12
73

LORD HANKEY.

Sir Edward Bridges 'phoned up and asked if you were letting the Americans know about the supply of rubber to Russia.

I told him that you were seeing Mr. Harriman about another matter this evening and that you would no doubt take the opportunity of mentioning the arrangements completed by you then.

Berkeley asked me to suggest to you that it might be advisable to stress to Mr. Harriman, as the Americans had not been very co-operative in the matter of facilitating the supply of rubber to Russia from the Far East, where their buyers have a great hold on the rubber market, that we were supplying these 10,000 tons at a considerable sacrifice to ourselves. The 10,000 tons represent about a month's British consumption, and we have only a seven months' stock at the present time.

Done,
H.
29.VII.41

Flannery
29th July, 1941.

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To see and return

OFFICES OF THE WAR CABINET
GREAT GEORGE STREET, S.W. 1

29th July, 1941. 74

Dear Lord Granville

I have been informed privately that A.C.G.I.S. has agreed to the proposal submitted at the last meeting of your Committee (Item 3, conclusion iii) that we should consider further the question of communications in the Persian Gulf area.

The position in Iran is exceedingly complicated. Political and military considerations are still under discussion on a high level, and no action has been possible except to encourage the U.K.C.C. to collect, convert, to *oil burning* and arrange to supply locomotives from Hongkong and other sources, and also a certain quantity of rolling stock. The provision of additional motor transport still meets with opposition from the Government of India, and improvements in administration, etc., clearly depend upon the political decisions still impending.

The question is so important from the standpoint of supplies to Russia, however, that I do not think we should further delay discussion of the improvements that might be made if political developments allow. There are no doubt many preparations that could be made, and in particular, we might attempt to smooth out the conflict of views as regards provision of additional motor transport.

Reference:-

CAB 63/156

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I have just learned that M.E.W. and the Ministry of War Transport consider that a good deal of material could be moved to Russia through India from Karachi by rail and road, practically avoiding Iranian territory altogether. This would circumvent political complications at present prevailing on the Persian side. I have asked these two departments to submit a paper explaining this proposal as a matter of urgency.

I should be grateful for your guidance on the next ~~subject~~ *step*. The Committee decided at their last meeting that an informal sub-committee should handle communications. As many departments will be involved, however, in the initial stage, you may prefer to have a meeting of the full committee to begin with. - In any event I suggest that it might be best to consider Iran and India only to begin with, on the basis of the urgent need for opening up an alternative route to Russia.

Iraq and Syria could come next. I believe that the War Office and Commander-in-Chief, India, are being reasonably active as regards the first, and that active steps are being taken to re-open communications in the second.

Yours sincerely
C. B. H. Key

The Rt. Hon. Lord Hankey,
G. C. B., G. C. E. G., G. C. V. O.,
55 Whitehall, S. W. 1.

I think we should have a meeting before you ^{on leave} go to size up the present situation and deal with this question.

30.11.41 H

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55.

Copies sent to:-

~~SECRET.~~
Sir Edward Bridges.
Captain Berkeley.
Lord Beaverbrook.

29th July, 1941.

PRIME MINISTER.

RUBBER FOR RUSSIA.

1. Arrangements for the despatch of 10,000 tons of Rubber to Russia are now complete.
2. The Rubber Control are releasing 10,000 tons from stocks in this country of types corresponding to Russian needs as ascertained by the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation from the Soviet Trade Delegation.
3. This quantity will be replaced in this country over the next few months.
4. The Ministry of War Transport are providing British shipping to load this rubber and certain other supplies. These ships, probably five in number, will be loaded within a week, or at most ten days, and will proceed northward to await Admiralty instructions as to convoy to a north Russian port.
5. Detailed arrangements are centralised with Mr. Justice in the Director of Sea Transport Department at the Ministry of War Transport.
6. A Russian request for rubber, which is clearly the same as that sent to you by Monsieur Stalin, has been received through the normal channels, through which a reply containing the above arrangements will be sent.

CAB 63/156

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Copy sent to Captain C.M. Berkeley.
and to Sir Edward Grigg. ³⁵⁴

SECRET.

30th July, 1941.

PRIME MINISTER.

I attach a draft on the basis of a telegram for
you to send to Monsieur Stalin.

I have delayed sending this draft earlier in the
day because I am momentarily hoping to hear that the
original 10,000 tons from Malays will be raised to 11,500
tons, so as to fill to capacity the s.s. "MAXIM GORKI" and
the s.s. KRASNY PARTISAN". At the moment, however, the
actual decision has not yet been taken, and to save delay
I have said in the last paragraph of the draft that the
total quantity of rubber will amount to "at least 10,000
tons".

(Sgd.) HANKEY.

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SECRET.

DRAFT TELEGRAM.

78

Following from Prime Minister
for Monsieur Stalin.

Following my personal intervention, arrangements are now complete for the despatch of 10,000 tons of rubber from this country to one of your northern ports.


2. In view of the urgency of your requirements we are taking the risk of depleting to this extent our metropolitan stocks, which are none too large and will take time to replace.

3. British ships carrying this rubber and certain other supplies will be loaded within a week, or at most ten days, and will sail to one of your northern ports as soon as the Admiralty can arrange convey.

4. This new amount of 10,000 tons is additional to the 10,000 tons of rubber already allotted from Malaya. *of this*
letter - answer
2,651 tons have already sailed on the 20th July in
s.s. "VOLGA" from Port Swettenham for Vladivostok.
s.s. "ARCTIKA" has also sailed from Malaya with 2,500 tons on board. s.s. "MAXIM GORKI", which left Shanghai on July 25th, and s.s. "KRASNY PARTISAN" due to sail from Hong.

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79

80

Kong on August 1st, should reach Malaya early in August and pick up additional cargoes of rubber which, added to those carried in the first two ships, will raise the amount to at least 10,000 tons.

55, Whitehall, S.W.1.

30th July, 1941.

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Telephone:
AVENUE 5011.

Telegram:
ENCONIDM, FRK, LONDON.

UNITED KINGDOM COMMERCIAL CORPORATION LTD.,

PLANTATION HOUSE
(Road Lane Entrance),
FRESHURCH STREET,
LONDON, E.C. 3

30th July 1941 81

The Rt. Hon. Lord Hankey, G.C.B., O.C.M.G., G.C.V.O.,
55, Whitehall,
S.W.1.

Dear Hankey,

1. There is a minor but urgent crisis about rubber for Russia which I fear I must refer to you.
2. As you will remember, four Russian boats, the "Volga", "Arctica", "Kraang Partisan" and "Maxim Gorki", have been ordered to Singapore and other Malay ports to load rubber, tin, etc. 10,000 tons of rubber have been made available for these boats and there has already been trouble about delays for the first two.
3. We have today been informed that if the last boat, the "Maxim Gorki" is to be fully loaded, it will require approximately 1,800 tons of rubber in addition to all the rubber mentioned above.
4. In the meantime, at the meeting over which Sir Edward Grigg presided on Monday, it was agreed that a further 10,000 tons of rubber should be made available for Russia immediately from stocks in this country.
5. Today, Sir Walrond Sinclair, the Rubber Controller, informs us that it will be necessary to replace this rubber at a much earlier date than seemed necessary at Monday's meeting. He is therefore finding it very difficult to agree to our obtaining the further 1,800 tons for the "Maxim Gorki", since he will require all available rubber from Malay to replace what is being drawn from our stocks in this country.
6. Having in mind the reproaches that have already been sent from Moscow about delays in loading Russian boats in Malay, it is, I think, impossible to contemplate sending the "Maxim Gorki" short-loaded.
7. It might therefore be suggested that, if we are to give Russia in Malay 1,800 tons of rubber in excess of what we first

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8. It was impossible to foresee this situation since, as these are Russian boats, their dimensions were unknown to us and it is only today that we have learned how much was loaded on the first three boats, and consequently what space was available on the "Maxim Gorki". Even the figure of 1,800 tons which I have used above is an estimate which may be modified to some extent when the final loading takes place.

9. The "Maxim Gorki" is due to arrive in Rangoon on August 11th with orders to take 1,000 tons of lead. This is all we can be quite sure of making available by that date. It is possible that a little more could be brought to Rangoon in time, but this could not exceed a further 500 tons. We should then in any case have space for about 1,300 tons of rubber. (I am advised that this figure is roughly correct in spite of the differences in deadweight and measurement weight of the two commodities.)

10. In all the circumstances, we must aim at loading a further 1,500 tons of rubber on the "Maxim Gorki", and if we succeed in doing this, we shall have a satisfactory cargo.

11. I am sending copies of this letter to Sir Edward Grigg, ~~and~~ Sir Walrond Sinclair and Villiers, M.E.W.

Yours sincerely,

Handwritten signature

SECRET

RUBBER FROM MALAYA.

The position of the supply of rubber from Malaya for Russia is as under:-

The following two ships have sailed:-

	<u>Tons</u>
s.s. "VOLGA" sailed from Port Swettenham for Vladivostok on July 20th with	2,651
s.s. "ARCTIKA" sailed from Malaya on	2,500
<u>Total rubber already despatched</u> ...	5,151
<u>Balance to be despatched</u> ...	4,849

Future sailings already arranged:-

"s.s. "KRASNY PARTISAN" due to sail for Malaya from Hong Kong on August 1st with	3,000
--	-----	-----	-----	-------

s.s. "MAXIM GORKI" sailed for Malaya from Shanghai on July 25th with	1,849
--	-------

Total - 4,849, making 10,000 tons in all.

s.s. "MAXIM GORKI" is a large ship and could carry an additional 1,500 - 1,800 tons, which would raise the total to at least 11,500 instead of 10,000 tons. It was thought that for the ship to arrive light at Vladivostok would create a bad impression ~~in~~ ~~xxx~~ with the Russian Government in view of their urgent need for rubber. The Ministry of Supply (Rubber Controller) were asked to find this additional amount. There was some difficulty owing to the need for replacing as soon as possible the 10,000 tons to be sent direct from England. Last night the officials stated that the additional 1,500 - 1,800 tons could be found, but this morning it is learnt that the Minister has decided against its release.

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OFFICES OF THE WAR CABINET
GREAT GEORGE STREET, S.W.1

84

31st July, 1941.

Dear Lord Hankey,

... I attach a copy of a letter we have received from Mr. Plowden in the Ministry of Aircraft Production who is the authority on aluminium. His letter discloses that our ability to supply the amount of aluminium which we had thought of supplying to the Russians may have been prejudiced by the recent strike at the smelter in Canada. We have not yet received a reply from the Americans as to whether they would be able to join with us in offering supplies of aluminium to the Russians, and until we get a reply to that telegram I do not think we should take any further action. Presumably we shall soon have more certain information of the effect which the Arvida strike has had on our aluminium supply.

I am sending a copy of this to Berkeley.

Yours sincerely,

W. J. Hasler

Mr. Hasler.
I agree, but we must
Watch this very carefully.
H.
31. VII. 41

The Rt. Hon. Lord Hankey, P.C., G.C.B., G.C.M.G. G.C.V.O.
55, Whitehall, S.W.1.

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Ministry of Aircraft
Production,
D.M.P., Millbank,
S.W.1.

S.B. 19716/DLP.

SECRET.

85

30th July, 1941.

Dear Brand,

You may have seen in the press reports of the strike at A.C.O.C's aluminium smelter at Arvida. We understand this will involve us in the loss of from 13,000 to 15,000 metric tons of aluminium, as there has been a shut-down of the entire plant, and full production cannot be resumed within three weeks.

I am afraid this loss at a time of rising requirements may materially affect our inability or willingness to set aside aluminium at the rate of 1,000 tons a month for the Russian Government, as contemplated in our recent discussions.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Professor Postan of the Ministry of Economic Warfare.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) E.L. PLOWDEN.

Hon. T.H.Brand,
War Cabinet Offices,
Gt. George Street,
S.W.1.

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WHITEHALL 3400

Copy sent to Sir Edward Grigg.

Captain Berkeley.

55, Whitehall, S.W.1.

SECRET.

31st July, 1941.

Dear Nixon,

1. Thank you for your letter of the 30th July about rubber for Russia.

2. Yesterday I was drafting a telegram which the Prime Minister wanted to send on this subject, and I gather that there was some hitch but luckily it was very cautious about the Malayan supplies in the "KASBNY PARTISAN" and "VAXIM GORKI."

3. I have been making inquiries and I gather that H.M.W. have the matter actively in hand and hope to obtain a satisfactory arrangement.

Yours sincerely,

P.S. Since dictating the above I learn by telephone that the matter has been settled and I gather that the Sir Frank Nixon, KCB. additional rubber will be released.

(Intd.) H.

Hol. 3434
Tel. No. ~~XXXXXXXX~~
737

Kup
AIR MINISTRY.

✓
KING CHARLES STREET.

SECRET.

WHITEHALL GARDEN.

PRINCES HOUSE, KINGSWAY, W.C. 2.

A.F.L.2.

7th August, 1941.

87

Dear *Lord Hankey*.

As I told you yesterday, I am unfortunately unable to come to the meeting to-morrow, but Flight Lieutenant Mallowan will speak on Air Ministry matters.

I attach a copy of a Progress Report on the supply of air material to Russia. I believe it covers everything aeronautical that we have been asked for other than the large scale general request for 6,000 aircraft, etc. which we are all agreed we are not yet prepared to consider as practical politics.

This Report is for your personal information, and I hope you will agree that none of the detail should be mentioned at the Committee. The three main points which Mallowan will make are :

- 1) Everything that can be supplied, and that is virtually all that is asked for at the moment other than our large size H.E. bombs and certain radio sets, is being shipped in the shipment which is to go shortly.
- 2) The Tomahawk position is still uncertain in that we are unable to supply spares and ammunition and have not yet heard whether the Americans will supply sufficient. You will remember that we made our offer of aircraft conditional on the Americans supplying the spares, etc.
- 3) We are, nevertheless, taking a risk and shipping at least 44 Tomahawks before we know whether there will be spares, ammunition and ground equipment for them.

The Rt. Hon. The
Lord Hankey, P.C., G.C.B., etc.
65, Whitehall,
S.W. 1.

Yours sincerely
S.P.H. Hankey

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88

Distribution.

P.S. to S. of S.

Vice C.A.S.

D. of Plans.

D.A.F.L.

A.I.2.(b)

Wing Commander Lowe.

Colonel Firebrace.

A.F.L.2.

Lord Hankey.

Mr. Couleoun, War Cabinet.

Movements 1.

S E C R E T.SUPPLY OF AIR MATERIAL TO RUSSIA.

PROGRESS REPORT : POSITION AT 1800 Hours
on 7.8.1941.

The following list covers all aeronautical items dealt with in General Golikov's letter to the Secretary of State for Air of July 24th, 1941 and at a meeting held at the Air Ministry between Admiral Kharlamov and Air Vice Marshal Medhurst on the 25th July, 1941.

1. ONE NIGHT FIGHTER (Hurricane IIA) equipped with V.H.F. on board ship. One set I.F.F. Mark II with accessories and six detonators at the dock side, and will sail on the same ship as the Hurricane.
2. DRAWINGS AND SPECIFICATIONS for the manufacture of V.H.F. are being prepared and will be ready in about three weeks.
3. DRAWINGS AND SPECIFICATIONS for 4 lb., 25 lb. incendiary bombs and 1,000 lb., 2,000 lb. and 4,000 H.E. bombs dispatched by aeroplane to Moscow on 28/7.

Duplicate sets of drawings and instructions for the use of small bomb containers received, one copy sent to Embassy on 4/8, second copy being sent to Moscow at earliest opportunity.
4. 1,500,000 INCENDIARY LEAVES (approximately 100 tons) about to be loaded on ship.
5. LARGE SIZE H.E. BOMBS. Six 1,000 lbs. bombs (not with R.D.X.) available but not being dispatched until Russians have informed us

90

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that they consider them suitable for Russian aircraft. Arrangements for visit to Bomber Stations for this purpose in hand.

6. BOMB SIGHTS. Three Mark IXA bomb sights are about to be loaded. Shipment of larger consignment will await information from Moscow as to probability of using this sight in Russian aircraft.

7. TOMAHAWKS.

(a) Of the 141 aircraft being dispatched from this country to Archangel 44 certainly, possibly more, will be got into the present shipment. The maximum that can be shipped immediately is 56.

(b) The 59 being released in the U.S.A. will be shipped to North Russia under arrangements made by the Americans.

(c) The U.S. Authorities will provide all spares and equipment for these machines with the exception of radio. They will also provide 4,000,000 rounds of .30 ammunition, but they cannot provide any .50 ammunition.

(d) No spares or ammunition are available from this country, and we have again urged that both should be supplied in sufficient quantity to cover all 200 aircraft by the U.S.A. Pending a final reply on this point, the proposal to supply 250,000 rounds of .50 ammunition from the U.K. has been put back for a week.

(e) We are providing radio (T.R.9.(d)) for all 200 aircraft. Moscow has been asked by signal if this set can be used by the Russians.

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The Tomahawks going from this country have the radio installed. The sets for the aircraft going from the U.S.A. will be shipped separately to North Russia.

(f) Details of flying characteristics, performance, etc. of the Tomahawks have been sent to Moscow by aeroplane and duplicate copies supplied to the Russians here.

(g) Instructors. The Americans have agreed to two of their Pilots, who were over here, going to Moscow nominally as Assistant Air Attaches to act as Instructors on the Tomahawk. One is already there, the other will follow at the earliest opportunity.

(h) The Americans have agreed to dispatch 10 technicians (5 airframe and 5 engine mechanics) to Russia in advance of the aircraft from U.S.A. It is hoped that these will be sufficient to supervise the maintenance of all 200 aircraft and that it will not be necessary to send two American mechanics from this country, the most in any case that we could spare.

8. TETRA ETHYL LEAD. 400 tons about to be shipped.

7th August, 1941.

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Squadron-Leader S.R.K. Glanville,
Air Ministry,
Princea House, Kingsway, W.C.2.

WHITEHALL 3400

Copy sent to Capt. C.M. Berkeley.
55,

SECRET.

13th August, 1941.

Dear Hall,

The interminable question of rubber will be coming up again at the meeting of the Allied Supplies Committee on Friday morning. I attach a copy of a memorandum that is being circulated on the subject.

You are aware no doubt that the Prime Minister has taken a particular interest in this question, and has sent personal telegrams to Monsieur Stalin on the subject. Information has reached me that the Prime Minister is particularly concerned in the whole question of Russian supplies, and as soon as he returns to London, or before, we are likely to be pressed to get on as fast as possible.

In the circumstances I am most anxious to do everything possible to push on with the question of rubber for Russia, and it would be a great help to me if you could obtain instructions from your Minister, if possible before Friday's meeting.

I expect that Lord Beaverbrook's Private Secretary can get a message through.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) HANKEY.

R.L. Hall, Esq.,
MINISTRY OF SUPPLY,
Steel House,
Tothill Street, S.W.1.

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OFFICES OF THE WAR CABINET
GREAT GEORGE STREET, S.W.1

MOST SECRET.

18th August, 1941. 95

Dear Lord Hankey

I understood from Bridges that it is not proposed to hold the Tripartite Conference in Moscow until some time next month, when it will no doubt be easier to estimate how far east the Russian front may be driven before the winter sets in, and therefore to what extent Russian raw material resources and industrial capacity remain available.

I also gathered that the Minister of Supply was to be the head of the British Delegation, though the newspapers this morning suggest that Mr. Eden may be going.

Subject to any discussions in which the Minister of Supply may at the moment be engaged in America, supplies to Russia are being handled as follows:

- (a) Military supplies: Service Departments, reporting more or less punctually to you and *acting* in one case (Air Ministry) in conjunction with the Americans through the Air Mission in Washington.
- (b) Raw material supplies: The M.E.W. machinery under Mr. Villiers, working very fully under the control of your Committee and handling the whole subject, except in so far as Ministers occasionally take a hand (e.g. in the case of rubber).

The Chiefs of Staff have more or less recognised the existing machinery and have referred to it specifically, in the case of military supplies also, in recent telegrams to General Macfarlane.

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A very
useful
suggestion
Please go
ahead.

H.

18. VIII. 41

96

In the circumstances, would it not be opportune to prepare a brief description of the existing machinery, to be placed in the hands of the Minister of Supply, and perhaps the Foreign Secretary, at a convenient opportunity? The Conference in Moscow will clearly be on a very high plane and we cannot hope to dovetail it a hundred percent into the existing machinery. At the same time a good deal of confusion may perhaps be avoided if those concerned are made aware fairly soon that some machinery does already exist.

The question of organising the Conference has not arisen yet so far as we are aware in this Office.

Yours sincerely
E. Butler

The Rt. Hon. Lord Hankey.

File

✓

OFFICES OF THE WAR CABINET
GREAT GEORGE STREET, S.W.1

MOST SECRET.

18th August, 1941. 47

Dear Lord Hankey

Military Supplies to Russia.

I have heard both from the Admiralty and from the War Office about the supplies to Russia with which they are at the moment occupied, excluding certain further naval items which are still under discussion.

The Admiralty are sending in the convoy now being assembled 4,000 aerial torpedoes, 1,000 mines, 300 6 ft. magnets for mine sweeping and a few odds and ends.

The War Office are shipping 700,000 pairs of boots and propose to send the remaining 2,300,000 in the next few weeks if shipping is available.

I have had no report from the Air Ministry, which is of course the most important at the present moment. We had a verbal assurance last week that arrangements for the supply of 200 Tomahawks were proceeding actively. I have also seen references to the despatch of a small number of Hurricanes, and to the possibility of sending bombers from the United States.

Glanville knows that you are anxious to have information and has promised to give you details privately as soon as he can. I think the reason for the delay is quite legitimate: intricate negotiations with the Americans are still proceeding on a high plane, and the supplies fall very nearly in an "operational" category.

Yours sincerely
C. G. Hankey

The Rt. Hon. Lord Hankey.

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Σημ. 1ης σελ.

20th August, 1941.

SUPPLIES TO RUSSIA - PERSIAN GULF ROUTES.

99

1. The policy of increasing supplies to Russia depends upon the traffic capacity and the security of the limited number of routes available. These routes are at present

- (a) the Siberian routes;
- (b) the Northern routes; and
- (c) the Persian Gulf routes.

The estimated present traffic capacity for supplies to Russia by the Northern routes is rather less than 10,000 tons daily; that of the Siberian routes is less than half, and that of the Persian Gulf routes well under one-tenth of the above figure.

The Siberian routes may at any moment be closed by the Japanese; the Northern routes are available only between June and mid-November and are open to enemy interruption, and the Persian Gulf routes are at present available for a negligible tonnage only. As the Persian Gulf routes are the least threatened and are also the shortest between the main sources of supply and the main centres of Russian consumption, their rapid expansion to maximum capacity is clearly of the highest importance if the successful execution of the new policy is to be assured.

2. Development of these routes cannot, however, proceed without regard to the strategic situation of India, which is thus expressed in the Government of India telegram No. 4182 of 11th August to the Secretary of State for India:-

"In our view the whole question must be regarded against a very wide background. If as you suggest in paragraph (2) of your telegram No. 8936 dated 30th July Vladivostok route may be cut off any moment it is clear that overland supply routes must be organised capable of carrying almost daily a volume of traffic equal to that now contemplated monthly for Bokkundi-Meshed route. If then we make a beginning with this Meshed route we shall probably be subjected to heavy pressure to develop it to a much increased carrying capacity. This in turn would involve strategic considerations of the highest importance. India's military contribution in other theatres of war has been and is determined on assumption that her western land frontier with Persia rests on a virtual vacuum so far as communications are concerned. If land communications through East Persia are to be highly developed it is apparent that the whole strategic conception must be reviewed and the question becomes one for consideration of C.O. in committee. This particular aspect of the problem will be stated in more detail by Chief of General Staff to Secretary, War Office."

3. A decision is required whether all the Persian Gulf routes to the U.S.S.R. should be developed as rapidly as possible to their maximum practicable capacity, which is in the region of 2,000 tons daily by rail and 1,000 tons by road, despite the strategic objections from the standpoint of India. If such authority is given the action contemplated is

- (a) immediate provision of some 170 additional locomotives and some 2,500 additional 17½ ton wagons for the Trans-Iranian Railway in order to achieve a capacity of some 2,000 tons daily. (This would require priority for the vehicles and their shipment as against competing needs, for example, of the Middle East.)
- (b) Port improvements in the Persian Gulf, particularly at Bandar Shahpur.
- (c) Port improvements on the Caspian Sea, requiring Russian co-operation.

(a)/

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- (d) Provision of additional lorries for feeder services between the Trans-Iranian Railway and Caspian Sea ports, or Russian land terminals.
- (e) Development of the East Persian route from India (Kokkundi through Meshed to Russia). (This would involve in addition to a survey now being undertaken, the provision of lorries, personnel, etc., either for a development up to a certain limit fixed on strategic grounds or a development up to the maximum of which the route is capable, believed to be between 3 and 600 tons daily.)

In addition there are three further routes of possible future importance; one from India to Russia through Afghanistan, the second through Iraq by road to Tabriz in Iran and thus to Russia, and the third through Turkey. The present capacity of these routes is less than 200 tons daily and their development is for various reasons likely to be a longer term problem than that of the routes already mentioned.

4. In so far as the consent and co-operation of the Persian Government are required any action taken is clearly dependent upon the settlement of our relations with Persia, but in order that planning and preparation may be carried forward without delay, a ruling is urgently required on the question whether any objection exists on the strategic grounds mentioned in paragraph 2 or on any other grounds to the maximum development of any or all of the Persian Gulf routes and facilities for supplies to Russia.

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Cmty

101

INDIA OFFICE,
CLARENCE HOUSE,
4 CENTRAL BUILDINGS,
MARTIN PARKER ST.,
N.W.1.

Most Secret

By special messenger

21st August, 1941.

We suggest the following amendments to your draft memorandum regarding routes to Russia:

(a) Cut out the word "Gulf" in the phrase "Persian Gulf" wherever it occurs in the note, except in paragraph 3(b). The route via Meshed is not really a Persian Gulf route at all, as it is based on India.

(b) In the last section of paragraph 1, the passage about the Northern routes - "of the Northern routes that via Archangel is full available only between June and mid-November, and that via Murmansk is open to enemy interruption." This is an amendment suggested by Montooth, who was in Archangel during the last war and says that a considerable quantity of cargo was brought in throughout the winter months with the aid of icebreakers. Murmansk is surely normally ice-free throughout the year.

(c) Start paragraph 2 as follows: "The Government of India have raised no question regarding the development of the Trans-Persian railway, but the development of the East Persian road cannot proceed without regard to the strategic situation of India, which is thus described, etc."

(d) In the second line from the end of your quotation from the Government of India's telegram, the words "C.O. in Committee" should be "Chiefs of Staff Committee."

(e) In view of the Cabinet decision last night we suggest that you add at the end of paragraph 2 the following passage - "Since this telegram was despatched it has been decided to invade Persia. Persian reactions will probably render it essential to

E. K. Nicholson, Esq.,
Ministry of War Transport.

/provide

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Reference:-

provide protection for the East Persian road if operated. This is a fresh military commitment, for which no provision has been made. The Government of India are not likely to view favourably any proposal that Russian forces should operate south of Meshed."

(f) In the introduction of paragraph 3 omit the words "which is in the region of 2,000 tons daily by rail and 1,000 by road despite the strategic objections from the standpoint of India." The first reason for this omission is that we know of no grounds for thinking that the East Persian road could carry anything like as much as 1,000 tons a day. The capacity of the railway and the road can be dealt with more suitably lower down in the memorandum. The second reason is that the Government of India raise no strategic objection now to the development of the railway.

(g) Insert after the first sentence of paragraph 3(a) the words "of which possibly two-thirds might be secured for Russian traffic."

(h) Alter paragraph 3(c) to run - "Port improvements at railhead and also at lorry route terminals on the Caspian Sea requiring Russian co-operation."

(i) Omit last four lines of paragraph 3(c) and insert instead after the word "lorries" "and personnel, and the improvement of the traffic. The Russians have suggested its development to a capacity of 70 tons per day and the maximum would be higher if considerable improvements were made to the track. The strategic objections to development increase with the extent to which the improvement of the track is involved."

(j) Start the existing last sentence of the last section of paragraph 3 as follows - "The present capacity of all these routes together is...etc." Add at the end of paragraph 3 - "Before the decision to develop Afghan routes could be taken, further consultation with the Government of India and H.E. Minister, Kabul, would be necessary. Pending their views a provisional opinion is that Afghan consent would be very difficult to obtain."

/(k)

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(k) Replace the last three lines of the memorandum by the following - "question whether all the routes and facilities for supplies to Russia through Persia should be developed to their maximum extent or whether any qualification in respect of the East Persian route is necessary on account of the strategic considerations mentioned in paragraph 2."

I am sending copies of this letter to Hankey, Drogheda, Ronald and McReady.

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11 Thurs 7057 SECRET

1011

Lord Hankey

Herewith a first draft of a
Memorandum as suggested in
my letter of the 18th.

I have tried to contrast
the chaos of military supplies
dealt with outside C.A.S. with
the relatively good order of
our land materials supply
organisation.

Lin. B. H. H.
20/VIII

DRAFT MEMORANDUM ON SUPPLIES TO RUSSIA.

(a) Military Supplies.

1. Very considerable demands for war equipment were put forward by the Russians at the end of June 1941.

These were considered by the Chiefs of Staff and General Macfarlane was ~~instructed to temperise~~. The same demands (the first two items of which are 3,000 fighters and 3,000 bombers) were later presented to the American Administration (see Telegram No. 504 Puree of 31st July). They are still under investigation in Washington.

*informant
has
been very like
hope of meeting
these demands
in the near
future.*

2. At an interview with Lord Hankey on 22nd July Mr. Hopkins reported that a proposal was being laid before the President to initiate a scheme of supplies to Russia of which the following were the main features:

- (i) A small number of pursuit planes immediately.
- (ii) Supplies of bombers to begin in April 1942.
- (iii) Small consignments of anti-aircraft guns beginning at once.
- (iv) Deliveries of certain quantities of raw materials, liquid fuel, industrial equipment etc. in proportions to be discussed, and including a certain amount of industrial material the export of which to Russia had previously been stopped by the American Authorities.

3. Plans for the supply of 200 Tomahawks (see (i) above) were at once set on foot by the Air Ministry in conjunction with the Air Mission in Washington. 140 of these machines are to be sent from this country and the balance to be withdrawn from consignments awaiting despatch from U.S.A. to Middle East. The provision of spares, equipment, and ammunition has proved difficult, *and is still under discussion*, but a bargain has now been

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~~marked out~~ with the Americans. Some of the Tomahawks from the U.K. ^{were ~~included~~} ~~are not on their way~~ in the convoy proceeding to the Arctic. It was reported that the Americans intended to fly some of the machines included ⁱⁿ ~~under~~ the balance of 60 aircraft from the U.S.A. via Alaska. ~~The Air Ministry have also arranged for the despatch of a small number of Hurricanes to North Russia, and the possible despatch of British bombers from the Middle East to South West Russia has been discussed.~~

4. The remaining items in the list reported by Mr. Hopkins are still under discussion in Washington. On 4th August Lord Halifax reported (Telegram No. 3668) that a Tripartite Anglo-Russo-American Committee ~~had been~~ set up in Washington to discuss aid to Russia. ^{H.M.G. having seen difficulties in one man representation and urged that the problem of Russian requirements should be discussed separately between the Mr. Hopkins and the Soviet Ambassador as the new basis to discussions of American supplies from Great Britain to Russia without reference to London was resisted by H.M.G. While discussions on a question of detail are proceeding the question of the Committee has in fact not begun to function, owing to the ~~absence of Mr. Hopkins, the sudden death of Mr. Parvia,~~ the discussions between the Prime Minister and the President, and the subsequent visit of the Minister of Supply to Washington.}

5. The present position remains, therefore, that the Air Ministry ^{are arranging} ~~have arranged~~ for the supply of a number of ^{Tomahawk} fighters in conjunction with the American Authorities, but that no further military ^{from the S.A. to Russia} supplies ^{except} have got beyond the stage of preliminary exploration. ~~On the British side, however, it should be added~~ that the Admiralty and War Office have taken advantage of the Arctic convoy to send certain small supplies including torpedoes, mines, and military boots.

6. Any further military supplies are presumably dependent upon the outcome of the Minister of Supply's visit to Washington and, in due course, of the projected Conference in Moscow.

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(b) Raw Material Supplies

7. Requests for supplies of considerable quantities of raw materials were received on 29th June 1941 (Telegram No. 77 Arfer from Moscow). These were at once considered by Lord Hankey's Committee and an organisation was built up in M.E.W. to handle the whole subject under the Committee's general direction.

8. The Russian requests for raw materials are transmitted by the Economic Section of the British Mission in Moscow to the Ministry of Economic Warfare and discussed in a special series of telegrams. Inter-departmental decisions on these requests are reached under the aegis of Lord Hankey's Committee and are then implemented by M.E.W. The U.K.C.C. have been appointed general buying and selling agents and conduct detailed negotiations as to prices, etc., with the Soviet Trade Delegation in London. The negotiation of a payments agreement has also been conducted by the Treasury through the M.E.W. channel and in consultation with Lord Hankey's Committee.

9. Many of the raw materials requested by the Russians can only be obtained from, or after consultation with, America. Lord Hankey's Committee has, ^{therefore} ~~for this purpose~~ been working in close contact with the Central Office for North American Supplies,

1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8		9		10	
1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8		9		10	

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~~It is the machinery described above, which is complex and involves much inter-departmental consultation and a considerable number of telegrams (notably on regards obtaining the work being smooth) and should be retained~~

10. The raw materials being supplied to Russia include rubber, tin, cobalt, shellac, jute, wool, lead, molybdenum concentrates, etc. Discussions are proceeding with regard to copper, rolled brass, aluminium, leather, iridium, and machine tools. A special consignment of rubber is going to Russia from the U.K. in the Arctic convoy. Certain supplies are to be sent from Russia to this country.

12. Lord Hankey's Committee ^{is also responsible} ~~have also taken the~~
~~responsibility~~ for discussing the problem of routes of
access to Russia. Up to the present all raw material
supplies to Russia have been carried in Russian ships
to Vladivostok. Owing to the precariousness of this
route, discussions have been proceeding with a view to
opening an alternative route through Persia, and proposals
on this subject are about to be submitted to higher
authority. It has been arranged that the Ministry of
War Transport should be responsible for the implementing
of any decisions reached regarding the improvement of inland

transportation facilities, in so far as these improvements are to be made in areas not regarded as spheres of military operations by the War Office.

(c) General suggestions.

13. It is ~~clear~~ clear that the machinery established by Lord Hankey's Committee provides the most convenient channel through which to implement decisions regarding supplies, whether of war equipment or raw materials, to Russia and for settling any related problems such as transport, finance, etc. The Chiefs of Staff have in fact ^{now} instructed the Service Departments to inform Lord Hankey's Committee of any action which they may take independently in this regard, and to use the Committee for any inter-departmental discussion (except on the high plane of major decisions of policy) that may be required. General Macfarlane has been so informed. Similarly the function of the Economic Section of the British Mission in Moscow as the channel for conveying raw material requirements has recently been confirmed.

14. It is therefore suggested that any decisions which may be reached on the ministerial or diplomatic level regarding further supplies to Russia should be referred to Lord Hankey's Committee for implementation through the existing machinery, which can readily be adapted to meet new demands.

15. The projected conference in Moscow will clearly be on a very high plane. It is suggested, however, that its contact with London should be with Lord Hankey's Committee, which can meet at short notice to make any inter-departmental arrangements required as a result of the Conference's decisions, and which can also collect any information that the Conference may require. It would no doubt be convenient to include in the British Delegation to the Mission an official familiar with the machinery which has now been in operation for two months.

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~
~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

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Wm. TRANSPORT

Telephone No.: ABBEY 7711.

MINISTRY OF SHIPPING,

Any reply to this communication
should quote the following reference

BERKELEY SQUARE HOUSE,
BERKELEY SQUARE,
LONDON, W.1.



E/IA 440

22 August 1941

Dear Lord Hankey

General Macready's comments
have reached me only after my
secretary has gone, & as the only
stipulation he makes is that the
views of C in C India should be added
I am not holding up the draft paper
further, but am attaching the relevant
extracts for insertion. F.O., I.O. &
MEW concur.

Yours sincerely
T M Anderson

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22nd August, 1941.

SUPPLIES TO RUSSIA - PERSIAN GULF ROUTES.

1. The policy of increasing supplies to Russia depends upon the traffic capacity and the security of the limited number of routes available. These routes are at present

- (a) the Siberian route;
- (b) the Northern routes; and
- (c) the Persian routes.

The estimated present traffic capacity for supplies to Russia by the Northern routes is rather less than 10,000 tons daily; that of the Siberian routes is less than half, and that of the Persian routes well under one-tenth of the above figure.

The Siberian routes may at any moment be closed by the Japanese; of the Northern routes that via Archangel is fully available only between June and mid-November, and that via Murmansk is open to enemy interruption, and the Persian routes are at present available for a negligible tonnage only. As the Persian routes are the least threatened and are also the shortest between the main sources of supply and the main centres of Russian consumption, their rapid expansion to maximum capacity is clearly of the highest importance if the successful execution of the new policy is to be assured.

2. The Government of India have raised no question regarding the development of the Trans-Persian railway, but development of the East Persian road cannot proceed without regard to the strategic situation of India, which is thus expressed in the Government of India telegram No. 4182 of 11th August to the Secretary of State for India:-

"In our view the whole question must be regarded against a very wide background. If as you suggest in paragraph (2) of your telegram No. 8936 dated 30th July Vladivostok route may be cut off any moment it is clear that overland supply routes must be organised capable of carrying almost daily a volume of traffic equal to that now contemplated monthly for Nekkundi-Meshed route. If then we make a beginning with this Meshed route we shall probably be subjected to heavy pressure to develop it to a much increased carrying capacity. This in turn would involve strategic considerations of the highest importance. India's military contribution in other theatres of war has been and is determined on assumption that her western land frontier with Persia rests on a virtual vacuum so far as communications are concerned. If land communications through East Persia are to be highly developed it is apparent that the whole strategic conception must be reviewed and the question becomes one for consideration of Chiefs of Staff Committee. This particular aspect of the problem will be stated in more detail by Chief of General Staff to Secretary, War Office."

INERT (A)

Since this telegram was despatched it has been decided to invade Persia. Persian reactions will probably render it essential to provide protection for the East Persian road if operated. This is a fresh military commitment, for which no provision has been made. The Government of India are not likely to view favourably any proposal that Russian forces should operate south of Meshed.

3. A decision is required whether all the Persian routes to the U.S.S.R. should be developed as rapidly as possible to their maximum practicable capacity. If such authority is given the action contemplated is

- (a) immediate provision of some 170 additional locomotives and some 2,500 additional 17½ ton wagons for the Trans-Persian railway in order to achieve a capacity of some 2,000 tons daily. (This would require priority for the vehicles and their shipment as against competing needs, for example, of the Middle East.)

(b)/

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- (b) Port improvements in the Persian Gulf, particularly at Bandar Shahpur.
- (c) Port improvements at railhead and also at lorry route terminals on the Caspian Sea, requiring Russian co-operation.
- (d) Provision of additional lorries for feeder services between the Trans-Persian railway and Caspian Sea ports, or Russian land terminals.
- (e) Development of the East Persian route from India (Nokkundi through Meshed to Russia). (This would involve in addition to a survey now being undertaken, the provision of lorries and personnel, and the improvement of the track. The Russians have suggested its development to a capacity of 70 tons per day and the maximum would be higher if considerable improvements were made to the track. The strategic objections to development increase with the extent to which the improvement of the track is involved.)

In addition there are three further routes of possible future importance; one from India to Russia through Afghanistan, the second through Iraq by road to Tabriz in Iran and thus to Russia, and the third through Turkey. The present capacity of these routes together is less than 200 tons daily and their development is for various reasons likely to be a longer term problem than that of the routes already mentioned. Before a decision to develop Afghan routes could be taken, further consultation with the Government of India and H.M. Minister, Kabul, would be necessary. Pending their views a provisional opinion is that Afghan consent would be very difficult to obtain.

In so far as the consent and co-operation of the Persian Government are required any action taken is clearly dependent upon the settlement of our relations with Persia. It is impossible to say what effect any hostility we may incur as a result of our increasing pressure in Persia may have upon the security of any of these routes, more particularly the railway, but there may well be very considerable interruption. In order, however, that planning and preparation may be carried forward without delay, a ruling is urgently required on the question whether all the routes and facilities for supplies to Russia through Persia should be developed to their maximum extent, or whether any qualification in respect of the East Persian route is necessary on account of the strategic considerations mentioned in paragraph 2.

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Insert
in para 3

(A)

113

(A)

C. in C. India in telegram 10991/G Cipher 13/8 adds :

"It will be appreciated that development of this (Nokkundi-Mashed) route will have serious effect on problem of defence of Western Frontier and provision and allotment of troops which at present takes into account lack of development in East Persia and Seletan. From purely strategical aspect we have always opposed any high development of the routes Herat - Kandahar and Mashed - Zahidan. We are already removing railway lines between Nokkundi and Mirjawa which are earmarked for other projects including Diabekr - Mardin and could only be replaced after some considerable period from India's production. In our opinion most practicable and suitable line for supplying Russia is via the Trans - Iranian Railway from Bandar Shapur to the Caspian. This route if selected would have no repercussions on the defence of India itself and could be destroyed comparatively easily whereas highly developed road communication on the immediate Western border of India would be most difficult to destroy and might be far more valuable to the enemy than to ourselves. We suggest C.I.S. should be consulted before any decision is made."

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E. 4925/3419/34.

Persia. Lord Henkey

With the Compliments
of the
Under Secretary of State
(F 6025/3419/34)
SECRET AND IMMEDIATE.

FOREIGN OFFICE, F.O.

22nd August, 1941.

22 AUG 1941

SECRET

Dear Nicholson,

Please refer to your most recent letter of the 20th August to Lord Henkey enclosing a draft statement on the development of Persian Gulf routes for supplies to the Soviet Union.

We agree generally in the draft and in the amendments suggested by Rumbold in his letter to you of the 21st August, except that we do not much like the addition suggested by Rumbold in his sub-paragraph (g). Our reason is that if, in the circumstances that are likely to arise in the immediate future, it is possible to send goods to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the Trans-Iranian Railway at all, we ought to be able to secure the whole advantage deriving from any additional rolling-stock supplied. We would also suggest the following amendment to paragraph 4 of the draft:-

A full stop after Persia in line three, and insert the following sentence:- It is impossible to say what effect any hostility we may incur as a result of our increasing pressure on Persia may have upon the security of any of these routes, more particularly the railway, but there may be very considerable interruption.

I am sending copies of this letter to Lord Henkey, Broghada, Macready and Rumbold.

Yours sincerely,

C.W. Baxter.

H.W. Nicholson, Esq.
Ministry of War Transport.

Copies sent to W.O.
I.O.
NEW.

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Reference:-

C O P Y.

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS OF MAJOR-GENERAL G.N. MACREADY.

Th. Rt. Hon. Lord Hankey.

S E C R E T.

THE WAR OFFICE,
WHITEHALL,
S.W.1.

22nd. August, 1941.

115

Dear Nicholson,

With reference to your letter of the 20th. inst. to Lord Hankey covering a statement on supplies to Russia by Persian routes, I agree generally to this statement as amended by the India Office in their letter of the 21st. August, but would put forward the following comments as a result of consultation with the D.K.O. & P. :-

- (a) The Defence of India Plan is based on the assumption that there is no threat to India from Seistan.
- (b) The capacity of the Meshed route is not capable of development on a scale which would materially affect the volume of supplies to Russia.
- (c) Lorries which could be made available and shipped for work on this route are probably very urgently required in the development of communications elsewhere, e.g. Basra to Mosul.

In view of (a) it is essential, I think, that the views of the Commander-in-Chief, India, as well as those of the Government of India, should be represented in the note which you propose to submit to higher authority. I attach a copy of the telegram from C.-in-C., India (10994/G of 13/8 to the War Office) on this subject, and suggest that the relevant text should be included in the draft memorandum after the views of the Government of India in Para. 2.

Yours

(Sgd) G.N. MACREADY.

E.M. Nicholson, Esq.,
Ministry of War Transport,
Berkeley Square House, W.1.

Copies to :- The Rt. Hon. Lord Hankey, Offices of the War Cabinet.
Lord Drogheda (M.E.W.)
M. Ronald, Esq., Foreign Office.
H.A. Rumbold, Esq., India Office.

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C O P Y.

MOST SECRET CYPHER TELEGRAM.

35021.

FROM :- C. in C. India

Desp. 1505 13.8.41.

TO :- The War Office.

Rptd. The India Office.

Recd. 1510 13.8.41.

IMPORTANT.

10991/G Cypher 13/8.

Ref. G.M. I. 4182 and 4183 11/8.

Retaxandum regarding development Nokkundi - Mushed route for supplies to Russia. It will be appreciated that development of this route will have serious affect on problem of defence of Western Frontier and provision and allotment of troops which at present takes into account lack of development in East Persia and Seistan. From purely strategical aspect we have always opposed any high development of the routes Herat - Kandahar and Mesbed - Zahiden. We are already removing railway lines between Nokkundi and Mirjawa which are earmarked for other projects including Diabekr - Mardin and could only be replaced after some considerable period from India's production. In our opinion most practicable and suitable line for supplying Russia is via the Trans - Iranian Railway from Bandar Sharpar to the Caspian. This route if selected would have no repercussions on the defence of India itself and could be destroyed comparatively easily whereas highly developed road communication on the immediate Western border of India would be most difficult to destroy and might be far more valuable to the enemy than to ourselves. We suggest C.I.S. should be consulted before any decision is made. ENDS.

C. 4 Telegrams

To M.O. 12 (For Action).

Copies to :- C.I.G.S.

V.C.I.G.S.

D.M.O. & P.

D.D.M.O. (O)

M.O. 1. 5. 12.

D.M.I.

D.D.M.I. (I)

M.I. 2. 2a. 3.

M.I. 1.

Q.M.G.

D.Q.M.G.

Q(Ops)

D. of Mov.

D. Tn.

D.D.Tn. (O)

Tn 1.

India Office (Col McCay)

F.O. (Mr. Bowker).

F.O. Mr. Crosthwaite.

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WHITEHALL 3400

Persian Communication

Copy sent to Capt. C.N. Berkeley.

E.M. Nicholson, War Transport.

55.

117

MOST SECRET.

22nd August, 1941.

Dear Hollis,

I enclose herewith a copy of a memorandum produced for the War Cabinet Committee on Allied Supplies about the traffic capacity and the security of a limited number of routes available for supplies to Russia.

The memorandum deals more particularly with the Persian routes, and, as you will see from the memorandum, the extent to which they can be developed depends upon strategical considerations connected with the defence of India.

We should be very glad if the Chiefs of Staff Committee could give us a ruling as to whether there is an objection on strategical grounds, or other military grounds, to the maximum development of any or all of the Persian routes and facilities for supplies to Russia mentioned in paragraph 3.

There is so much planning and preparatory work to be done to improve communications with Russia and Persia, and Russia's needs may soon become so great, that I do not think we ought to delay matters while the situation in Persia is being cleared up. And I understand that the decisions we want depend on long-term military policy connected with the defence of India, rather than on the present military situation and the immediate future.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) HANKEY.

Colonel L.C. Hollis, CBE., RM.

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22nd August, 1941.

SUPPLIES TO RUSSIA - PERSIAN GULF ROUTES.

1. The policy of increasing supplies to Russia depends upon the traffic capacity and the security of the limited number of routes available. These routes are at present

- (a) the Siberian routes;
- (b) the Northern routes; and
- (c) the Persian routes.

The estimated present traffic capacity for supplies to Russia by the Northern routes is rather less than 10,000 tons daily; that of the Siberian routes is less than half, and that of the Persian routes well under one-tenth of the above figures.

The Siberian routes may at any moment be closed by the Japanese; of the Northern routes that via Archangel is fully available only between June and mid-November, and that via Murmanek is open to enemy interruption and the Persian routes are at present available for a negligible tonnage only. As the Persian routes are the least threatened and are also the shortest between the main sources of supply and the main centres of Russian consumption, their rapid expansion to maximum capacity is clearly of the highest importance if the successful execution of the new policy is to be assured.

2. The Government of India have raised no question regarding the development of the Trans-Persian railway, but development of the East Persian road cannot proceed without regard to the strategic situation of India, which is thus expressed in the Government of India telegram No. 4162 of 11th August to the Secretary of State for India:-

"In our view the whole question must be regarded against a very wide background. If as you suggest in paragraph (2) of your telegram No. 8936 dated 30th July Vladivostok route may be cut off any moment it is clear that overland supply routes must be organised capable of carrying almost daily a volume of traffic equal to that now contemplated monthly for Nokkundi-Meshed route. If then we make a beginning with this Meshed route we shall probably be subjected to heavy pressure to develop it to a much increased carrying capacity. This in turn would involve strategic considerations of the highest importance. India's military contribution in other theatres of war has been and is determined on assumption that her western land frontier with Persia rests on a virtual vacuum so far as communications are concerned. If land communications through West Persia are to be highly developed it is apparent that the whole strategic conception must be reviewed and the question becomes one for consideration of Chiefs of Staff Committee. This particular aspect of the problem will be stated in more detail by Chief of General Staff to Secretary, War Office."

C. in C. India in telegram 10991/G Cipher 13/8 adds:-

"It will be appreciated that development of this (Nokkundi-Meshed) route will have serious effect on problem of defence of Western Frontier and provision and allotment of troops which at present takes into account lack of development in East Persia and Seistan. From purely strategical aspect we have always opposed any high development of the routes Herat - Kandahar and Meshed - Zahidan. We are already removing railway lines between Nokkundi and Mirjawa which are earmarked for other projects including Diabekr - Mardin and could

only

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only be replaced after some considerable period from India's production. In our opinion most practicable and suitable line for supplying Russia is via the Trans - Iranian Railway from Bunder Sharpur to the Caspian. This route if selected would have no repercussions on the Defence of India itself and could be destroyed comparatively easily whereas highly developed road communication on the immediate Western border of India would be most difficult to destroy and might be far more valuable to the enemy than to ourselves. We suggest C.I.S. should be consulted before any decision is made."

Since these telegrams were despatched it has been decided to invade Persia. Persian reactions will probably render it essential to provide protection for the East Persian road if operated. This is a fresh military commitment, for which no provision has been made. The Government of India are not likely to view favourably any proposal that Russian forces should operate south of Meshed.

3. A decision is required whether all the Persian routes to the U.S.S.R. should be developed as rapidly as possible to their maximum practicable capacity. If such authority is given the action contemplated is

- (a) immediate provision of some 170 additional locomotives and some 2,500 additional 17½ ton wagons for the Trans-Persian railway in order to achieve a capacity of some 2,000 tons daily. (This would require priority for the vehicles and their shipment as against competing needs, for example, of the Middle East.)
- (b) Port improvements in the Persian Gulf, particularly at Bandar Shuhpur.
- (c) Port improvements at railhead and also at lorry route terminals on the Caspian Sea, requiring Russian co-operation.
- (d) Provision of additional lorries for feeder services between the Trans-Persian railway and Caspian Sea ports, or Russian land terminals.
- (e) Development of the East Persian route from India (Bokkundi through Meshed to Russia). (This would involve in addition to a survey now being undertaken, the provision of lorries and personnel and the improvement of the track. The Russians have suggested its development to a capacity of 70 tons per day and the maximum would be higher if considerable improvements were made to the track. The strategic objections to development increase with the extent to which the improvement of the track is involved.)

In addition there are three further routes of possible future importance; one from India to Russia through Afghanistan, the second through Iraq by road to Tabriz in Iran and thus to Russia, and the third through Turkey. The present capacity of all these routes together is less than 200 tons daily and their development is for various reasons likely to be a longer term problem than that of the routes already mentioned. Before a decision to develop Afghan routes could be taken, further consultation with the Government of India and H.M. Minister, Kabul, would be necessary. Pending their views a provisional opinion is that Afghan consent would be very difficult to obtain.

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4. In so far as the consent and co-operation of the Persian Government are required any action taken is clearly dependent upon the settlement of our relations with Persia. It is impossible to say what effect any hostility we may incur as a result of our increasing pressure in Persia may have upon the security of any of these routes, more particularly the railway, but there may well be very considerable interruption. In order, however, that planning and preparation may be carried forward without delay, a ruling is urgently required on the question whether all the routes and facilities for supplies to Russia through Persia should be developed to their maximum extent, or whether any qualification in respect of the East Persian route is necessary on account of the strategic considerations mentioned in paragraph 2.

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OFFICES OF THE WAR CABINET
GREAT GEORGE STREET, S.W.1

25th August.
10 p.m.

Dear Lord Hankey 121

The attached note on
rubber and tin for Russia was
left at 7-E.W. by Lord
Strathallen this afternoon
and has just reached me.

I am not circulating
it, as it is too late; also
the U.K.C.C. are the agents
of the Ministry of Supply
in these matters and I think

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The latter should be given the opportunity of commenting on these facts before they are given official circulation.

At the same time the note illustrates the dangers of the present head-to-mouth arrangements, and you will doubtless bear it in mind in connection with our discussions to-morrow afternoon.

Yours sincerely
C. A. Jenkins

U.K.C.C. 257 Aug/41
123

1. The s.s. "Wellen" is due to leave Hong Kong at the end of this month. Her cargo is still to be determined. Moscow has asked that she should, if possible, load tin and rubber rather than lead and jute. She could load approximately:

1,500 tons of tin or lead.
6,000 tons of rubber or jute.

2. An immediate decision as to which commodities the "Wellen" shall load must be taken, if possible, by August 27th, so that the necessary buying orders and shipping instructions can be given.

3. Shipments of tin to Russia so far completed, loading or proposed, have been as follows:-

Delivered Vladivostok	- 1,000 tons
Loading in the Far East	- 1,000 tons
Proposed for the "Volga"	- 150/500 tons

Maximum total: 2,500 tons.

It has been tentatively agreed that tin shipments to Russia could be at the rate of 1,500 tons a month; for the 3 months ending September there is thus a balance of at least 2,000 tons to be shipped of which the "Wellen" could carry the greater part.

4. Shipments of rubber so far completed, loading or proposed, are as follows:-

Delivered Vladivostok	- about 5,000 tons
Loading in the Far East	- 5,000 tons
Proposed for the "Volga"	- about 2,700 tons
Sent from the U.K.	- 10,000 tons

Total: 22,700 tons

5. If the "Wellen" carried a cargo of 6,000 tons of rubber this, in conjunction with the "Volga" shipment, would exceed by about 1,000 tons the monthly quota tentatively suggested of 7,500 tons. On the other hand, at the meeting of the Committee of the Co-ordination of Allied Supplies on August 15th, the importance of seizing every shipping opportunity while Vladivostok remained open was stressed. At that meeting the approval of the Minister of Supply and the American authorities for a programme of shipments of rubber to Russia was sought with "special attention to the early arrival of the s.s. "Wellen" at Batavia, where a considerable cargo was to be picked up for early shipment to Vladivostok."

6. If the Minister of Supply and the American authorities agree to the shipment of the rubber and tin on the s.s. "Wellen" this must come from the Dutch East Indies as stocks in a few Strait Settlement ports are not adequate. American permission for these releases from the Dutch East Indies stocks is necessary.

7. While the broad question of a programme of supplies of tin and rubber to Russia remains to be settled, a decision on what the "Wellen" is to load - tin and rubber or lead and jute - cannot be delayed and it is requested that the Minister of Supply and the U.S.A. be consulted at once on this specific issue.

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8. For reasons of prudence it may prove desirable to ship lesser amounts of tin ~~tin~~, making up the cargo with another commodity such as sugar which is also needed at Vladivostok. Whether this variation in cargo should be made depends in part on what other ships may be available for loading in the Far East later in September. Permission to make such a variation in the cargo of the s.s. "Wallen" is asked.

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S/HG
25th August 1941.

Persian Communications

OFFICES OF THE WAR CABINET,

GWYDYR HOUSE,

WHITEHALL, S.W.1.

✓ 25th August 1925

10 p.m.

Dear Lord Hankey

The Chiefs of Staff have answered
in the affirmative our three questions:

- (a) large-scale improvement of the railway
route through Persia (paras 3 (a) to (d) of
your report), subject to reference of
priority issues to higher authority;
- (b) development of the East Persia lorry
route to 2000 tons a month;
- (c) investigation of other possible trans-
Persian routes.

The whole of work subject to a
settlement of the present trouble. But we
are authorised to make preparations now.
There was a long discussion, of which I
have as yet no details.

Yours sincerely

Curzon



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126

MOST SECRET.

10 Downing Street,
Whitehall.

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MINUTE
SERIAL NO. D.242/1. *on Amery's Memo*

GENERAL ISMAI.

This should be considered by one of the Committees under the C.O.S. Committee. What I am principally concerned with is the through route from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian. The other projects mentioned by Mr. Amery seem to be more speculative. Alternatively, a motor road might suffice, or be better. It is of the utmost importance that strong railway detachments should be available, and rolling stock of the proper gauge to utilize to the full the supply of the Volga basin by improving the existing railway facilities.

Let me have a report within one week, and a synopsis of the report not exceeding two pages.

(Itl.) W.S.C.

26.8.41.

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Persian Communications

SECRET.

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PRIME MINISTER.

CHIEFS OF STAFF (41) 296TH MEETING.

Minute 4: Supplies to Russia - Development of Persian Gulf Routes.

The Vice-Chiefs of Staff, at Lord Hankey's request, have examined the strategical effect of developing the trans-Persian supply routes to Russia, with particular reference to the problem of the defence of India.

2. - They agreed that large scale railway improvements (with consequential port and other improvements) on the Bandar Shahrpur - Caspian Sea route should be undertaken as soon as possible, and they recommend the development of the East Persian lorry route (Nok Kundi-Mashhad).

3. Lord Hankey's organisation for Co-ordination of Allied Supplies will now press on with plans and preparations for the development of these routes. Your minute (Flag 'A'), which has just been received, is accordingly being referred to Lord Hankey for the preparation of a report on the wider issues raised by Mr. Amery's minute (Flag 'B').

D.242/1.
enclosure
to D.242/1.

27th August, 1941.

(Sgd.) L.C. Hollis.

Lord Hankey.

Please report progress in one week and on one sheet.

(Intd.) W.S.C.

29.8.41.

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PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MINUTE

COPY

SERIAL No. *In 848/1*

MINISTER OF SUPPLY.
MINISTER OF WAR TRANSPORT.

128

X LORD HANKEY. X

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR.

Great railway developments are inevitable in the Middle Eastern theatre, down the Red Sea, in Persia, and laterally by Palestine and Iraq. Lord Hankey's Committee is at work on the broad lay-out, but the Minister of Supply and the Minister of War Transport should already be looking out for ways and means.

W.S.C.

30.8.41.

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[Cypher]

SPECIAL ARFAR DISTRIBUTION

FROM MOSCOW TO MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE

129

Sir S. Cripps
No. 293. Arfar. Mossy.
 August 28th, 1941.

D. 9.15. p.m. 28th August, 1941.
 R. 6.45. a.m. 29th August, 1941.

b b b b b b

My telegram No. 290.

Five Soviet ships with a speed of nine to ten knots will join convoy on its return journey. Their names and dead tonnages are:

Rodina 7,800;
 Sukhona 5,200;
 Alma-Ata 5,500;
 Sevzaples 6,180;
 Stary Bolshevik 6,180.

The last two are motor vessels.

2. The Stary Bolshevik is already loaded with goods for United States but the other four will load timber for us at Omega.

3. If goods are available in United Kingdom and if they can form part of a convoy, they will return to U.S.S.R., otherwise they will proceed to the United States either in ballast or, if we wish, carrying goods for us. I have assured the Soviet authorities that they will be sent in convoy accordingly to the United Kingdom and the United States.

4. Soviet authorities will be responsible for arranging insurance for all their ships and the cargo on Stary Bolshevik. We are responsible for insurance on our ships and cargoes, and on our cargoes on Soviet ships.

131/10/350
 Lada H. H. H.
 30.8.41

DRAFT.

PRIME MINISTER.

130

SUPPLIES TO RUSSIA: DEVELOPMENT OF PERSIAN GULF ROUTES.

A. You asked me on 29th August to submit a brief report on the development of the Persian Gulf routes for supplies to Russia. This report follows. Development of these particular routes must be considered in conjunction with developments of other routes in the Middle East - some of which are discussed in Mr. Amery's note to you of 25th August - and I understand that the War Office are placing before the Chiefs of Staff a general report raising the priority issues as regards the supply of railway materiel, etc., involved in these competing projects. Meanwhile the present note deals ^{solely} with the Trans-Persian route as a means of supplying Russia. ~~exclusively~~.

Trans-Persian Routes to Russia.

(1) Railway.

1. The existing capacity of the Persian railway from Bandar Shahpur to the Caspian ports, available for supplies to Russia, is 200/250 tons net daily. Arrangements are already in hand [to provide a small number of locomotives and rolling stock] to bring this figure up to 300/375 tons a day, [and this increase should be secured by the end of the year.]

2. Further development of the capacity of the line is being considered in two stages:

- (a) Provision of [37] locomotives and [450] wagons to bring the through traffic capacity up to 600/750 tons daily;

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

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(b) Provision of [168] locomotives and [2,100] wagons to bring the capacity up to 2,000 tons a day. (This would involve considerable work in improving watering facilities, the development of the port of Bandar Shahpur, and the provision of much additional motor transport and river craft for the lower stretch).

3. These further developments involve questions of priority of supply of material which the War Office, [as the Department responsible for the general development of transport facilities in the Middle East,] are placing before the Chiefs of Staff. [My Committee for the Co-ordination of Supplies to Allies are keeping in close touch with the War Office and the Chiefs of Staff organisation in order that Russia's transport needs by this route are kept well to the fore in the general picture.]

4. It has been agreed that there must be some form of Allied control of the Persian railway if full use is to be made of it for our purposes. The Foreign Office have taken up this point, and the War Office are considering the provision of the railway operating and workshop personnel required. The Commander-in-Chief, India, is also being asked to undertake a detailed reconnaissance.

(11) Roads.

(a) Western Persia.

5. Further information on possible road developments in Western Persia is being sought. The most likely route is that from ^{Na} Khar~~q~~in on the Iraqi border: but any considerable traffic by this route would throw a heavy additional burden on the Beera-Bagdad railway, [the capacity of which is already inadequate and the improvement of which is included in the survey of competing claims for railway equipment now being submitted to the Chiefs of Staff by the War Office.]

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[Pending the result of enquiries as to the most practicable routes, the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation is investigating the possibilities of organizing a road transport system through civil contractors, and a number of lorries on Persian order in the United States are to be shipped at an early date.]

[Meanwhile a test consignment of lead and jute for Russia is on its way to Bandar Shahpur in a British ship; its on-transport across Persia will provide a useful clue to the road transport situation.] It is agreed that the vulnerability of the Trans-Persian railway makes the development of alternative road transport facilities a matter of considerable importance.

(b) Eastern Persia.

6. The Chiefs of Staff have now recommended the immediate development of the East Persian lorry route (Nok Kundi - Meehad) to a capacity of 2,000 tons a month, and the Government of India will make the necessary arrangements. [A trial consignment for Russia has already been purchased and routed to Nok Kundi.] Control of the facilities is to remain in the hands of the Government of India Authorities.

(iii) Northern Exit.

7. It is considered that any developments required at the Persian ports on the Caspian and on the roads connecting them with the Trans-Persian railway can be left to the Russians at this stage. [In any case the problems on the north side of Persia are not so severe as those on the south side.]

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